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**Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services**

# United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme

## Report of the Secretary-General

*Summary*

Fellowships on disarmament were awarded to 24 officials in 2009 and to 25 officials in 2010. The programme of studies continues to be structured in three segments. The first segment is held at the United Nations Office at Geneva and introduces the fellows to various aspects of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. It also includes a study visit organized by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The second segment of the programme comprises study visits to international organizations of relevance in the field of disarmament and Member States, upon their invitation. Specifically, the fellows visit the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. At the invitation of the Governments of Germany, Japan and China, recipients of the fellowship programme participate in country study visits. The third segment of the programme, which takes place at United Nations Headquarters, is aimed at familiarizing the fellows with the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. In 2009, the programme ran from 24 August to 23 October. The programme in 2010 is scheduled to run from 23 August to 22 October. In an effort to promote gender mainstreaming, the United Nations selected 22 women to participate in the fellowship programme in the biennium 2009-2010, who account for 45 per cent of the total awarded fellowships.

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To date, the programme trained 808 officials from 159 Member States, a large number of whom hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament and international security with their own Governments. The Secretary-General is pleased to note the contribution of the programme of fellowships on disarmament to promoting a greater awareness of the importance of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The programme continues to afford an important opportunity to facilitate a better understanding of the work of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and of the other institutions working in the areas of international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control at the global level, as well as of the security concerns of Member States. In addition, the Secretary-General is gratified to note that the number of women nominated fellows has remained high during the current biennium. The Secretary-General expresses his appreciation to all Member States and international organizations which have supported the programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success.

# I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 63/79, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services", the General Assembly, inter alia, commended the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme had continued to be carried out and requested him to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

# II. Programme of fellowships on disarmament

## A. Fellowships for 2009 and 2010

2. In 2009, fellowships were awarded to the following 24 officials:

| | |
|---|---|
| Ms. Lianna Mnkrtchyan | Armenia |
| Mr. Aykhan Hajizada | Azerbaijan |
| Mr. S. M. Mahbubul Alam | Bangladesh |
| Mr. Prak Nguon Hong | Cambodia |
| Ms. Thérèse Christiane Hanglog | Cameroon |
| Mr. Juan Pablo Jara | Chile |
| Mr. Zhao Kun | China |
| Ms. Aliaa Eldeeb | Egypt |
| Ms. Dessy Oneida Reyes-Yanez | Honduras |
| Mr. Attila Juhász | Hungary |
| Mr. Taghi Mohammadpour Ferami | Iran (Islamic Republic of) |
| Mr. Thailesh Kumar Chamane | Mauritius |
| Ms. Siang Tial | Myanmar |
| Mr. Dilip Kumar Paudel | Nepal |
| Ms. Monika Lipert-Sowa | Poland |
| Ms. Jang Se Young | Republic of Korea |
| Ms. Elena Vodopolova | Russian Federation |
| Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily | Senegal |
| Mr. Klemen Polak | Slovenia |
| Mr. Madi Elfatih Ali Ibrahim | Sudan |
| Mr. Matteo Fachinotti | Switzerland |

| | |
|---|---|
| Mr. Goran Trajkov | The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| Mr. Artem Vorobyov | Ukraine |
| Mr. Shukhratjon Yigitaliyev | Uzbekistan |

3. In 2010, fellowships were awarded to the following 25 officials:

| | |
|---|---|
| Ms. Radia Fatiha Kaddour | Algeria |
| Ms. Maria Victoria Picazo | Argentina |
| Mr. Josué Castro | Australia |
| Ms. Rinchen Dema | Bhutan |
| Ms. Armelle Emassi Tchago | Cameroon |
| Ms. Hongliu Zhang | China |
| Mr. Carlos Enrique Valencia Muñoz | Colombia |
| Ms. Petra Rubesova | Czech Republic |
| Mr. Vasil Rubashvili | Georgia |
| Ms. Adisa Yakubu | Ghana |
| Mr. Fodé Moussa Bangoura | Guinea |
| Mr. Maytham Al-Rikabi | Iraq |
| Mr. Yuki Kimura | Japan |
| Ms. Kumiushay Suiumbaeva | Kyrgyzstan |
| Mr. Bachir Saleh Azzam | Lebanon |
| Mr. Gediminas Kliukas | Lithuania |
| Ms. Angela Mija Franckline Rasoarinjafy | Madagascar |
| Ms. Madhvi Seebaluck | Mauritius |
| Mr. Amartuvshin Amgalanbayar | Mongolia |
| Ms. Stanica Andic | Montenegro |
| Ms. Narcisa Daciana Vladulescu | Romania |
| Mr. Alexander Vladimirovich Kuklin | Russian Federation |
| Ms. Kesarin Phanarangsan | Thailand |
| Ms. Silvana Cecilia Della Gatta Alvarez | Uruguay |
| Mr. Giang Dang | Viet Nam |

4. Over the years, the efforts by the United Nations to promote gender mainstreaming has resulted in an increase in the number of women recipients of the fellowship. During the biennium 2009-2010, in particular, 22 of the 49 fellowships were granted to women.

## B. Programme of studies

5. The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament is implemented by the Geneva branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. In 2009, the programme ran from 24 August to 23 October. In 2010, the programme is scheduled to run from 23 August to 22 October. The programme of studies is structured in three segments: (a) activities at the United Nations Office at Geneva; (b) study visits to intergovernmental organizations of relevance in the field of disarmament and to Member States, upon invitation; and (c) activities at the United Nations Headquarters. The activities of the 2009 programme are summarized below. The 2010 programme will generally follow the 2009 syllabus, with updates to reflect recent developments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

### First segment

6. The first segment of the programme takes place at the United Nations Office at Geneva and exposes the fellows to various aspects of multilateral work on disarmament, including potential negotiations, through the work of the Conference on Disarmament and of some Geneva-based research institutions dealing with disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The fellows attend the plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament and receive briefings on its history, achievements and methods of work. In 2009, the fellows were given lectures by the Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Quaker United Nations Office and by the staff of the Geneva branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Such lectures covered the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines, the work of UNIDIR, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its victim assistance provisions, the role of non-governmental organizations in the multilateral disarmament process, the Conference on Disarmament, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Security Council, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the Biological Weapons Convention. In 2009, the fellows attended a seminar on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty which was jointly organized by UNIDIR, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

7. In addition to the above, the fellows participated in 2009 in a one-day visit to Bern, organized by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, during which they were briefed on Swiss foreign and security policies, with a focus on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, cluster munitions and related issues of international humanitarian law, as well as on the Geneva Declaration of Armed Violence and Development. A similar visit is scheduled during the 2010 programme.

8. While in Geneva, the fellows are also required to conduct research and to write the first draft of a paper on a topic of their choice relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and international security.

**Second segment**

9. The second segment of the programme comprises study visits to three intergovernmental organizations: the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. This second segment of the programme also includes study visits to Member States, at their invitation.

10. During the visit to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, the fellows are briefed on the history and prospects of the Treaty, the current work of the Preparatory Commission and its verification regime. In 2010, the fellows are invited to make a field trip to the Radionuclide station at the Vienna International Centre. Furthermore, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission will organize a nuclear crisis-related simulation exercise for the benefit of the fellows.

11. The study visit to the IAEA comprises briefings on the Agency's safeguards system, the security of nuclear materials and radioactive sources and the IAEA illicit trafficking database. A visit to the Laboratory in the Department of Safeguards is also included.

12. At OPCW, the fellows are briefed on the work of the Organisation, its contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, as well as the origins and status of implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, its verification procedures and its implementation at the national level, as well as on issues of international cooperation and assistance.

13. In 2009, the Governments of Germany and Japan continued the established practice of inviting participants in the fellowship programme to visit national institutions and to attend lectures given by their government officials. In 2009, participants in the programme were also invited for a study visit by the Government of China. These country visits provide the fellows with an invaluable opportunity to become acquainted with the respective national foreign policies in the areas of international security through lectures, meetings with government officials and scholars and visits to existing relevant facilities. In 2010, the Governments of China, Germany and Japan have extended similar invitations.

14. The study visit to Germany in 2009 included briefings by representatives of the Federal Foreign Office and non-governmental organizations. The fellows also visited Nammo Buck GmbH in Pinnow, a plant for the demilitarization of ammunition, projectiles, rockets, mines, grenades, fuses and pyrotechnical material. During the visit, the fellows were briefed on environmentally friendly recycling and disposal processes for conventional ammunition and explosive products. The study visit to Germany in 2010 will include similar activities.

15. The Government of Japan and the administrations of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continued to organize invaluable activities for the recipients of the disarmament fellowship in 2009. In Tokyo, the fellows were briefed by officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Hiroshima, the fellows visited the Peace Memorial Museum, the Atomic Bomb Dome and the National Peace Memorial Hall

for the Atomic Bomb Victims. They were also briefed by the Mayor of Hiroshima and had the opportunity to listen to the testimony of a survivor of the atomic bombing. In Nagasaki, the fellows visited the Atomic Bomb Hypocentre and Museum, the Peace Memorial Hall and the Hill of Grace, and met with survivors of the atomic bombings, as well as scholars. The study visit to Japan in 2010 will include similar activities.

16. The study visit to China in 2009 included briefings by officers of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by representatives of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, which coordinates academic and non-governmental research and activities regarding arms control and disarmament. The fellows also visited the China Institute of Atomic Energy. The study visit to China in 2010 will include similar activities.

**Third segment**

17. The third segment of the programme is held at United Nations Headquarters and is intended to familiarize the fellows with the mandate and activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and with the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly. This segment of the programme includes a series of lectures by senior staff of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, including the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on the structure and responsibilities of the Office, as well as briefings by the Chairman of the First Committee and by members of delegations on items on the agenda of the Committee. The fellows attend meetings of the First Committee of the General Assembly, and panel discussions organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the NGO Committee on Disarmament.

18. In addition, while in New York, the fellows participate in discussions moderated by the coordinator of the fellowship programme on selected disarmament topics, and take part in a practical exercise on the preparation and submission of draft resolutions for the First Committee of the General Assembly. The exercise includes a discussion of the drafts prepared by the fellows, the introduction of amendments and the process of taking action on draft resolutions. During this time, the fellows are asked to finalize their research papers and to make short presentations on their main views.

19. At the end of the programme, the fellows are awarded a certificate of participation by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

## III. Conclusion

20. Launched in 1979 as a follow-up to a decision of the General Assembly taken at its tenth special session in 1978, the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament is aimed at promoting expertise in disarmament in Member States, particularly in developing countries. During its 30 years of operation, the programme has trained 808 officials from 159 States. Many alumni hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments and at permanent missions to the United Nations. The large number of nominations received for the programme every year by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the broad support for the biennial resolution on United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services is a testimony of the undiminished

interest of Governments in the programme. At the same time, the role of the programme in enhancing the capabilities of young diplomats for participation in arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations is recognized and appreciated by Member States.

21. The Secretary-General is pleased to note the contribution of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament to promoting greater awareness of the importance of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The programme continues to play a decisive role in facilitating a better understanding of the work of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and of the other institutions working in the areas of international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control at the global level, as well as of the security concerns of Member States. In addition, the Secretary-General is gratified to note that the number of women nominated has remained high during the current biennium.

22. The Secretary-General expresses his gratitude to all Member States and organizations which have supported the programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success. The Secretary-General extends his particular appreciation to the Governments of Germany and Japan for the continuation of their support to the programme, as well as to the Government of China and Switzerland for organizing study visits in 2009 and 2010. The Secretary-General also extends his grateful recognition to IAEA, OPCW and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission for their support to the programme.

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**Sixty-fifth session**
Item 63 (b) of the provisional agenda*
**New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support: causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa**

# Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa

## Report of the Secretary-General

*Summary*

The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 24 of General Assembly resolution 63/304, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the outcome of the review of the recommendations contained in his 1998 report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (A/52/871-S/1998/318).

Section I reviews progress made in the implementation of the 1998 recommendations, assesses the achievements and identifies persistent obstacles. Section II reflects the current trend of thinking regarding the nexus between peace and development and identifies emerging issues and challenges that Africa and the United Nations may face in the future. Section III calls for the necessary mobilization of resources and partners. Section IV sets out recommendations and proposals for renewed United Nations engagement with Africa.

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# I. Introduction

1. On 25 September 1997, the Security Council convened a meeting at the level of foreign ministers to consider the need for concerted international effort to promote peace and security in Africa. In the presidential statement issued on that day (S/PRST/1997/46), the Council observed that, despite some progress, armed conflicts remained a matter of grave concern requiring a determined response.

2. In reply to the request of the Security Council, a comprehensive analysis was undertaken in 1998 and a report, to be updated annually, was submitted on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (A/52/871-S/1998/318). In the report, my predecessor proposed a set of realistic and achievable measures for African countries, the United Nations and Member States to take in order to significantly reduce political tensions and violence within and between African States, build durable peace and promote socio-economic and political development.

3. In my 2007 report to the General Assembly (A/62/204), I stated my intention to undertake a comprehensive review of the recommendations contained in the 1998 report, as well as of the commitments made, actions taken, progress achieved and lessons learned since 1998. The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 24 of General Assembly resolution 63/304.

4. In preparing the report, I conducted extensive consultations with and greatly benefited from the views of African States, other Member States, the African Union, African regional economic communities, African and international civil society organizations, representatives of academia and think tanks, the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group, the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations system through the Inter-Agency Departmental Task Force on African Affairs of the Office of the Special Adviser for Africa.

5. In following up the original recommendations, I intend to focus on future challenges and stimulate a debate on how to generate additional political, human, financial and technical support and effective partnerships to better assist Africa in addressing the root causes of armed conflict and in promoting durable peace and sustainable development in the twenty-first century.

# II. A decade in review

6. The 1998 report addressed Africa's economic and political marginalization, attempting a realistic appraisal of the challenges that hampered Africa's recovery while acknowledging the continuing impact of the complex legacies of the past. In examining the sensitive questions of governance, democratic freedoms and basic human rights, it decried authoritarian rule, ethnically driven politics, corruption and the mismanagement of resources, as well as the role that some African and non-African States played in supporting or instigating armed conflicts in the region. The year 1998 was a time of widespread conflict and unresolved structural, political and governance problems in Africa, when the memories of the tragedies of Rwanda and Liberia were still fresh.

7. Despite the numerous challenges facing Africa at the time, the report highlighted Africa's significant political, economic and social achievements. It called on all concerned to summon the political will to effect positive change and for Africans to take a self-critical look at their own role in the crises, stressing the importance of Africa's responsibility in this regard. It also defined key actors and institutions in Africa and at the international level that could assist in resolving protracted conflicts, preventing new ones from occurring and advancing socio-economic development. The message of the 1998 report was as clear then as it is now: only Africa can provide solutions to Africa's problems.

8. The past decade has witnessed outstanding improvements in many areas. Africa has made more institutional progress than any other region in the world, including in building institutions for collective problem-solving and in engaging with the international community. The remarkable improvement in the overall security landscape has been one of the consequences of the significant progress in governance, democratization and leadership, and the holding of reasonably transparent elections. In the late 1990s, 14 of Africa's 53 States were engaged in armed conflict. Currently, four countries are, although many States remain institutionally weak and severely challenged in their ability to promote security and prosperity for their peoples.

9. Africa has also experienced significant economic growth, an average of 4.65 per cent between 2000 and 2007, according to the Economic Commission for Africa publication, *Economic Report on Africa 2010: Promoting High-level Sustainable Growth to Reduce Unemployment in Africa*, and has made substantial improvements in such social development areas as education, although results vary considerably from one country to another. The past decade has witnessed substantial progress in macroeconomic fiscal policies and structural reforms, including better management of debt and substantial debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Africa continues to seek broader policy space and greater control of its economic agenda. Since 2000, substantive efforts have been made in Africa to mobilize domestic resources for development. Nevertheless, Africa's economy remains undiversified, thereby relying substantially on the export of unprocessed natural resources. Africa continues to face the economic challenges of creating productive and decent employment and of improving the quality of life of its people.

10. In 2007, I established the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group, which has identified a set of key recommendations and initiatives in five strategic areas, namely, agriculture and food security; education; health; infrastructure and trade facilitation; and the national statistical system. Through its institutional members, the Steering Group is transforming the recommendations and emerging realities from the Millennium Development Goals review process into comprehensive implementation action points. The initiative, if well implemented, will support African countries in their struggle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. With just five years left before that deadline, **I call on all partners, especially during the High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, to be held in September, to re-energize global efforts in respect of the Goals and to agree on a concrete action plan to accelerate progress towards meeting them by 2015.**

## A. Responding to situations of conflict

11. The 1998 report noted that the ability of international actors to assist Africa hinged in large measure on the quality and strength of African institutions to respond to challenges. With the adoption of the African Union Constitutive Act and the establishment of the African Union and its Commission in 2002, African leaders have endowed the continent with an institution much more capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century and have developed a vision of a more peaceful, better governed and more integrated continent. In January 2009, the African Union summit resolved to transform the Commission of the African Union into the African Union Authority, which has an expanded mandate and greater capacities.

12. The African Union Constitutive Act has replaced the principle of non-interference with the principle of non-indifference, representing a fundamental change with regard to the conduct of inter-African relations and commitment to the protection of human rights, including rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.

13. In 2002, at its first ordinary session, the Assembly of the African Union adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Council, responsible for implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture, is supported by the Commission of the African Union, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. The African Peace and Security Architecture is represented at the regional level by the regional economic communities acting as its building blocks, thus supporting local and national efforts for early warning, conflict prevention and conflict management. The regional standby brigades will constitute an important component of the African Standby Force.

14. There has also been revitalized engagement between the African Union and the United Nations, with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council holding annual meetings to share information and strengthen cooperation in such areas as conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

15. One of the elements of that engagement was the adoption of the 2006 Declaration entitled "Enhancing United Nations-African Union Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union (see A/61/630, annex). The programme was conceived as an evolving strategic framework for cooperation with the African Union, which would involve institutional capacity-building and human resources development for the African Union and wider partnerships between United Nations agencies and regional and subregional organizations. During its first three years, it has focused on peace and security issues and on supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture. United Nations agencies have also taken the lead in various initiatives and clusters since 2007 to support the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), including through the regional coordination mechanism. The Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme, which is currently under review, has been instrumental in improving collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations system and in enhancing coherence between the United Nations system and African institutions. **While recognizing the ongoing need to address peace and security, the focus of the Programme should now be gradually expanded to encompass social and economic development issues in the areas set out below.**

### 1. Early warning and conflict prevention

16. Conferences such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which led to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, have galvanized regional efforts for peacemaking. With the creation in the Department of Political Affairs of the Policy and Mediation Division and its mediation support standby teams, the United Nations is in a better position to work collaboratively with African mediation institutions to enhance peacemaking.

17. The increased appointment of mediators and their effectiveness in intervening, at times with assistance from the African Union and the regional economic communities, in emerging or ongoing conflicts, has had a positive impact on peacemaking in such places as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar and the Sudan. The establishment of the Panel of the Wise responds to the call in the 1998 report for the appointment of special mediators and pre-empts the possible proliferation of mediators with overlapping mandates.

18. At the regional level, the regional economic communities have evolved their own early warning and conflict prevention systems, including councils of elders and wisemen, which are working with continental bodies. They have strengthened their capacities in early warning, monitoring and preparedness for conflict situations with a view to effectively putting in place mitigation mechanisms. In 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. ECOWAS and the East African Community have undertaken several mediation initiatives in Burundi, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Niger. Through its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, the Southern African Development Community has had a central role in Madagascar, and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development has set up cross-border mechanisms to deal with the issue of armed pastoralist groups and cross-border conflicts. The regional economic communities have also become the pillars of African involvement with the international community, for instance, through the European Union-funded African Peace Facility.

19. In 2002, the Security Council established the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) to assist the United Nations in contributing more meaningfully to conflict prevention and in addressing such emerging challenges at the regional level as the spread of illicit small arms and small weapons or drug trafficking, including through preventive diplomacy and inter-agency cooperation. The Department of Political Affairs has established a political presence in the Great Lakes region and in the Southern African Development Community. This innovative approach has facilitated the improved coordination of diverse regional actors as part of the development of a comprehensive conflict-prevention strategy in Africa in collaboration with African stakeholders. **I call on Member States to support my initiative to establish a United Nations political presence in other African regions in order to further support regional conflict-prevention, integration and peacemaking efforts.**

### 2. Stemming the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons

20. The devastating consequences of the excessive accumulation of and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons has prompted a growing number of African countries, United Nations agencies and entities, such as the Office for Disarmament

Affairs and non-governmental organizations, to develop measures to curb the illicit small arms proliferation. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials entered into force in November 2009. The East African Community and the Southern African Development Community adopted similar protocols in 2000 and 2001, respectively. On 30 April 2010, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa adopted the Central African Convention on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair or Assembly ("Kinshasa Convention"). At the continental level, in 1999 the Organization of African Unity condemned the illicit proliferation and trafficking in small arms. Since then, the African Union has embarked on efforts to harmonize continental initiatives and is in the process of developing a continental strategy. Many African countries have also developed national action plans in line with United Nations and African Union programmes to address the growing problem of the leakage of such arms and ammunition from Government stocks of legally acquired weapons.

21. These issues were addressed by the Security Council in a number of thematic debates. Its most recent meeting, held on 19 March 2009, on the impact of illicit arms trafficking on peace and security in the Central African region, followed up the report (S/2008/258) in which I sought to frame the issue conceptually. In 2001, States adopted the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which contains steps for improving national legislation and controls and devotes specific attention to regional implementation. The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, was adopted in 2005. **I call on all States to ratify or accede to the Protocol, to adopt crime-control measures and to implement appropriate normative provisions.** In response to the absence of a normative framework regarding arms transfers, the General Assembly has decided to convene in 2012 a United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (see resolution 64/48). **I call on Member States to support a robust arms trade treaty.**

### 3. Peacekeeping

22. The 1998 report expressed concerns about the reluctance of international actors to devote sufficient political and financial resources to operations in Africa. Since then, there has been an exponential increase in peacekeeping operations, with 7 of the current 16 missions deployed in Africa. The current level of engagement is a testament to the commitment of the General Assembly and Security Council to address the consequences of armed conflict in Africa and of their preparedness to authorize resources in that regard. It also reflects the increasing commitment of African institutions to exercise their influence, illustrated by the engagement of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in West Africa and the African Union in Darfur. Similarly, the engagement of Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa in Burundi has paved the way for the wider engagement of the international community.

23. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) underscores the determination to find a careful, albeit intricate, balance between United Nations and African regional responsibilities in peacekeeping, as well as the strategic relationship between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and

Security Council. The UNAMID mechanism for peacekeeping in Africa allows the international community to supplement regional actors and institutions with resources. The United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) supports African Union troops in Somalia, delivering a logistics capacity support package to AMISOM. The United Nations also provides technical expertise to support the African Union Commission in its management, planning and deployment of AMISOM through the United Nations planning team in Addis Ababa. These arrangements meet a current requirement but are no substitute for a long-term African peacekeeping capacity. The ongoing development of the African Standby Force is a key element to achieving the capabilities necessary for the African Union to fully exercise its obligations under the Constitutive Act. **The support of the international community for the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and the African Standby Force in particular, is essential if dependency on external support is to be reduced and Africa is to have the capacity to respond to the security challenges of the continent.**

24. The report of the African Union-United Nations panel that I appointed to consider the modalities for supporting African Union peacekeeping operations (A/63/666-S/2008/813) and my subsequent report on support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (A/64/359-S/2009/470) recognized that more structured coordination between the Secretariat and the Commission of the African Union was critical to promoting an effective partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. To this end, a number of initiatives are being implemented, including the establishment of the African Union/United Nations joint task force on peace and security and the initiative to strengthen the peace and security presence of the United Nations in Addis Ababa through the establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union.

25. The need for predictable and sustainable funding to support African Union peacekeeping was also examined by the African Union-United Nations panel. Some progress has been made with regard to simplifying the arrangements for donor funding. **I welcome the decision of the African Union to increase the allotment of its regular budget to the African Union Peace Fund.** These initiatives, combined with ongoing support to assist the African Union in developing its capacity to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate peacekeeping missions, constitute the critical first steps in securing resources to support African Union peacekeeping deployments.

### 4. Humanitarian assistance

26. Despite the relative decline of civil conflicts in Africa since 1998, humanitarian crises continue to be prevalent in the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa, Somalia, the Sudan and the Sahel region. The increased severity of natural hazards, the scarcity of water and of energy resources, continued high food prices, population growth and urbanization and, more recently, the global financial crises, have led to a large increase in the demand for humanitarian assistance, including by African Governments. Delivery of assistance to affected communities continues to be hampered by insecurity, poor infrastructure, bureaucratic delays and seasonal conditions.

27. The consequences of limited access to affected populations by humanitarian partners requires urgent consideration. This calls for all stakeholders, including parties to conflicts, to support principled delivery of humanitarian assistance and

protection in compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights. Mobilizing resources and making sufficient quantities available on a timely basis are the crucial first steps for coordinating an effective humanitarian response.

28. Regional organizations and Member States are providing increased support for the development of local, national and regional preparedness and emergency response capacities. Through the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations continues to support the African Union and ECOWAS in strengthening their regional disaster response capacities. ECOWAS is establishing a regional stockpile of humanitarian supplies for West Africa, training its own emergency response teams and broadening its relief financing mechanism. In the Sahel region, countries are responding to chronic food insecurity and child malnutrition using emergency aid in support of longer-term development efforts.

29. The 1998 report called for coordinated mechanisms of providing assistance and for better sequencing of humanitarian and development strategies in order to facilitate the transition from conflict to economic recovery and reconstruction. During the past decade, the coordination of international humanitarian assistance in Africa has seen major improvements, including the creation of the cluster approach, the strengthening of leadership through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and more efficient financing mechanisms and tools, which have led to improved inter-agency coordination, delivery of assistance and protection of affected populations. Through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and mechanisms such as consolidated appeals and the Central Emergency Response Fund, the United Nations and its partners have broadened global appeals for humanitarian assistance. Additional efforts are still required to effectively address the gap between humanitarian assistance and development. **The efforts of the African Union to coordinate and conduct humanitarian actions, including through the development of a humanitarian framework, should be supported.** This would include fostering close collaboration between African Union peace support operations, humanitarian and post-conflict recovery activities and cooperation in addressing the problems of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons.

30. Although bilateral and multilateral donors have expanded the budgets available for humanitarian purposes since the late 1990s, the annual appeals by the United Nations for humanitarian assistance often fail to meet their targets, particularly with respect to early recovery initiatives. This is especially true for protracted humanitarian crises that no longer garner significant international attention. A formidable challenge remains in respect of mobilizing resources to support early recovery programmes against competing demands for resource requirements relevant to mainstream development programming. **The United Nations system will ensure that early recovery initiatives are systematically prioritized, incorporated and mainstreamed in emergency humanitarian financing mechanisms and resource mobilization initiatives.**

### 5. Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding

31. The 1998 report contained a recommendation to establish a post-conflict peacebuilding structure to help countries emerging out of conflict and transitioning to development. In 2001, the Economic and Social Council established the ad hoc advisory groups on African countries emerging from conflict, with a subsidiary group each for Guinea-Bissau (2002) and Burundi (2003). Following the creation of

the Peacebuilding Commission, pursuant to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the two countries were transferred to the agenda of the Commission. In concert with its country-specific configurations, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Offices and the Peacebuilding Fund, the Commission is an essential mechanism for linking peace and development agendas. The Commission has assisted in coordinating initiatives, actors and resources in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, thus helping to focus international attention on countries that might otherwise have elicited limited engagement. Peacebuilding Fund funding is also available for eight other countries that I have declared eligible: Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia and the Sudan.

32. Through the establishment of its peacebuilding architecture, special political missions and integrated peacebuilding offices, the United Nations is in a position to better collaborate with relevant institutions at the national level. Experience has shown that successful peacebuilding requires long-term engagement, a higher degree of flexibility and continued experimentation with different models of cooperation at the country level to ensure that funds, strategies and the country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission respond to the specific and unique needs of each post-conflict situation.

33. A number of other United Nations agencies continue to promote peacebuilding within their respective mandates. Several United Nations system initiatives aim at strengthening policy coherence in peacebuilding. These include the integrated mission planning process, the peacebuilding contact group and the peace and security cluster of the regional coordination mechanism, which supported the African Union in the development of the African Union policy on the reconstruction and development of post-conflict countries, adopted in 2006. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continue to assist in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, including in reforming State institutions, promoting democratic governance and solidifying the rule of law. Similarly, the International Labour Organization works to enhance national capacities for social dialogue and tripartism. The United Nations Children's Fund has been helping to rebuild basic social services, including through the strengthening of education and health systems in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration, launched in Geneva in November 2009, was intended to scale up and maximize the impact, coherence and efficiency of employment and reintegration support provided to post-conflict countries by United Nations agencies. The United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace promotes sport as a tool to support peacebuilding processes in post-conflict situations, while the Global Compact facilitates cooperation between the United Nations and the business community's "Business and peace" programme, which encourages and supports the contribution of that community to post-conflict reconstruction.

34. **Post-conflict peacebuilding priorities must focus on promoting pro-poor growth, ensuring access to basic services and accelerating socially inclusive, equitable and sustainable development.** They must be owned and led by affected communities, with the full participation of local institutions and community organizations, especially the private sector, civil society, women, youth and children. In seeking to bridge funding in the transition from conflict to recovery, it

is necessary to address the disconnect between the political commitments entered into by Member States and the actual disbursement of funds pledged.

35. Effectively addressing impunity and injustice in post-conflict situations remains a major challenge. Peace often depends on the ability to heal the wounds of the past and to restore trust and confidence in the capacity of the State to deliver justice and protect its citizens. Countries that have done this relatively well, such as South Africa, are now steadily consolidating their democracies. The United Nations Democracy Fund supports strengthening the voice of civil society and promoting human rights and encourages the participation of all groups in the democratization process.

36. Efforts in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have made a difference in the success of peacebuilding in Africa. As a component of peacekeeping operations and a precondition for stability and security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes have fortified weak States grappling with militarized communities and groups. Ineffective demobilization and reintegration of armed groups can lead to a return to conflict, hence the need to ensure the success of the entire process. With the exception of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where conflict persists, donor investment in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, such as the 2002 World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for the Great Lakes, has contributed to rebuilding social ties and laying the foundations for development. Efforts to secure the longer-term demobilization of children and youth associated with armed groups have continued, including the development of action plans by parties to armed conflict as called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2007) concerning the release of child recruits. **This process requires sustained support and a community-driven approach. I enjoin Member States that are in conflict to create a conducive environment to strengthen and sustain this process.**

37. Within a broader governance agenda, reforming the security sector after conflict, in order to ensure adherence to democratic principles and the effective protection of the rights of citizens and the promotion of social order, is the main responsibility of the State and the cornerstone of post-conflict peacebuilding. The African Union has adopted a policy framework for security sector reform as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Union post-conflict reconstruction and development framework. Under its conflict prevention framework, ECOWAS has developed a security sector reform model. Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania have provided security sector reform support to fellow African countries. Successful United Nations support for security sector reform must be based on the principle of national ownership. United Nations actors must coordinate and sustain assistance to security sector reform processes, consider the regional dimensions of the processes and commit to long-term deployments.

### 6. Sanctions

38. During the past decade, the Security Council has made greater use of targeted sanctions, such as arms embargoes, travel bans and assets freezes, aimed at those responsible for threats to or breaches of international peace and security. The measures have been employed in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan. The Council has also

established expert groups, a number of which receive support from United Nations peacekeeping operations, which monitor the implementation of targeted sanctions and provide recommendations on how to increase their effectiveness and on how to mitigate their humanitarian and socio-economic impact. The recommendations have been implemented by the Security Council and Member States with varying levels of success. **Cooperation with expert groups should be enhanced to the extent possible through the establishment of embargo cells or focal points within relevant peacekeeping operations.**

39. Challenges to the effective implementation of targeted sanctions by Member States can often be attributed to a lack of political will, a lack of capacity to enforce them on the ground or a combination of both. **The United Nations will provide Member States with assistance to increase their capacity to implement targeted sanctions regimes.** The interest in targeted sanctions by African regional organizations, such as the African Union and ECOWAS, provides new opportunities in this regard. **A wider awareness among the private sector of the parameters of Security Council sanctions regimes should be encouraged.**

## B. Promoting economic growth and social development

40. Since 1998, our understanding of and perspective on social and economic development has significantly broadened, integrally linking economic growth and socio-economic development with stability, social development, social justice and human rights. Rapid socio-economic transformation is central to progress on the Millennium Development Goals, which can only be achieved under a peaceful and stable environment. The recommendations of the 1998 report, however, fell short of considering this inclusive approach, covering each of the aspects set out below somewhat separately. Inclusiveness of socio-economic development strategies is central to our strategy to address challenges and develop opportunities in the future (see section III below).

### 1. Governance

41. Since the late 1990s, Africa has made substantial progress in building democratic governance, encouraging pluralism and strengthening the role of parliaments and civil society, thus ensuring more accountability by Governments. Not all countries have embraced these principles; where they have taken root, however, the principles have allowed for more responsive Governments that are better able to deliver public goods, promote security and create policies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequalities. Elected and representative Governments are also demanding greater responsibility from their citizens, including through the payment of taxes and by meeting other civic obligations. Some Governments have encouraged the participation of civil society, undertaken economic reforms that strengthen markets and promoted private and public partnerships in order to ensure better service delivery.

42. In several countries, opening up the political space has enriched national decision-making processes. In other countries, leadership capacity whether in government, civil society or the private sector, needs to be encouraged and supported. **It is necessary to strengthen the leadership capacities at the community, local, national and regional levels.**

43. Since the 1990s, the liberalization of the media and better access to information has empowered citizens to become more effective participants in political processes. In a few countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the radio stations of United Nations peacekeeping operations have helped to train national broadcasters. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations radio station was merged with the State radio service to form a new public broadcasting corporation. Overall, however, the African press continues to face numerous obstacles, including State opposition, and the standards for professionalism and ethics are uneven. **The United Nations system will assist African media practitioners in strengthening the skills, objectivity, ethical standards and independence of the profession.**

44. NEPAD was established in 2001 by the Organization of African Unity as an African platform for Africa's economic recovery and integration into the global economy. NEPAD has allowed for greater ownership and leadership of Africa's own economic and social policies. It has provided the structure to develop stronger partnerships with emerging economies, south-south cooperation arrangements and a better dialogue with the Group of Eight, which resulted in the creation of the Africa Partnership Forum. As part of the integration of NEPAD into the African Union structures, the NEPAD secretariat was recently transformed into the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency. NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals reflect African and global convergence on the priorities underscored in the 1998 report. NEPAD embodies international standards on governance, economic reforms, management of public institutions and resources and the protection of human rights, and commits African countries to sound economic and social reforms that foster growth and attract investment and enhance the voice, participation and empowerment of all members of society.

45. As of the end of June 2010, 30 countries had acceded to the voluntary African Peer Review Mechanism process, enabling evaluators to assess their performance in such areas as democracy, human rights, freedom of the press, peace and security, economic policy and the business environment. The Review Mechanism process is still nascent and only 12 countries have completed it. Where completed, the Review Mechanism has promoted consultations between Governments, civil society and the private sector and has opened dialogue on such previously controversial subjects as corruption and public integrity. The 2006 Review Mechanism country report for Kenya, for example, broached all the political and economic issues that had led to post-electoral violence in 2008. The Review Mechanism is a useful diagnostic tool, even in its present configuration.

46. A continental initiative to improve governance, such as the Pan-African Parliament, which was established by the African Union in 2004, remains an advisory body that meets twice a year, but has no actual legislative power. The Pan-African Parliament should be empowered to deliver on its mandates, especially in the areas of promoting peace, security and stability; facilitating the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the African Union; promoting the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa; and encouraging good governance, transparency and accountability. **I enjoin Member States to support the Pan-African Parliament to deliver on these mandates, in particular on peace, security and stability in Africa.** Parliamentarians have an important role to play in integrating this regional programme of actions into national action plans.

## 2. Electoral processes and constitutionalism

47. In the past decade, much of Africa has seen the emergence of a culture of peaceful transfers of power through democratic elections and constitutional referendums as the principal way to legitimize governance. These gains are threatened, however, by weak democratic institutions, judicial systems and political parties; the underrepresentation of women; issues of citizenship; limited freedom of the press; and an increase in contentious and violent election processes. The root causes of election-related violence usually include weak or inadequate State structures, lack of adequate power-sharing arrangements, economic inequality, deep societal divisions and a history of political violence. In the heterogeneous African setting, political and electoral systems that ensure political inclusion and a fair distribution of economic as well as political rewards and responsibilities are increasingly supported. They can go some way in moderating the competitive intensity of "winner-takes-all" systems inherited from former colonial countries, which can lead to the exclusion of minorities.

48. In 2007 the African Union adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance with a view to addressing some of these challenges. Only four countries have so far ratified it. Other instruments include the 2004 Southern African Development Community Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, the 2002 NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These obligations, principles and commitments form an increasingly strong basis for the work of civil domestic observers, whose importance and impact is growing, and of international observers when assessing the conduct of elections.

49. If the potential for contentious and violent election processes is to be reduced, it is necessary to address the root causes and to ensure that the key elements of the electoral process that can reduce the potential for election-related violence are in place. These include broad trust and confidence in electoral institutions, a level playing field for political contestants, an accurate voter registration process, transparency, particularly in the results process, and a fair and expeditious dispute resolution system. The fact that the "winner-takes-all" syndrome has been linked to conflicts in a number of countries underscores the need to adopt the sharing of political rewards through proportional representation in election results. **I call on Member States, African intergovernmental organizations and election stakeholders to work together with the United Nations to address the root causes of election-related violence and election process issues that can reduce the potential for such violence.**

50. Other worrisome issues include the recent unconstitutional changes of power in countries characterized by fragile democratic institutions and socio-economic, ethnic and racial disparities. Fortunately, this trend has been met with regional and continental efforts to find effective solutions. Of particular significance is the adoption in 2010 by the Assembly of the African Union of the Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacity of the African Union to Manage Such Situations (Assembly/AU/4(XVI)), which grants powers to the Assembly to suspend the country concerned from participating in the organs of the African Union and, among other measures, to impose sanctions against that country. The decision underlines the commitment of the African Union to improve governance, the rule of law and constitutionalism on the continent.

### 3. Administrative effectiveness

51. Broad reforms in the governance arena have also improved administrative efficiency and capacity. Monetary and financial institutions such as central banks are gaining more independence in economic management, and efforts have been made to increase transparency and reduce corruption. The 2001 Charter for the Public Service in Africa and the 2006 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption contain provisions that aim at creating common standards of professionalism and ethics in public administration throughout Africa.

52. Corruption remains a major problem in Africa. Its pervasiveness, which makes the management of public resources difficult and impedes productive investment and service delivery, has been mentioned as a major cause of conflict in many countries. To date, 41 African countries have signed or ratified the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption, although few countries have accorded meaningful powers and resources to national bodies tasked with fighting it. Though progress has been made, much more is needed, including ensuring appropriate accountability for public expenditures in order to effectively combat the problem in both the public and private sectors. Member States should be committed to institutionalizing prevention and enforcement strategies.

### 4. Economic development

53. During the past decade, Africa experienced substantial improvement in its economic performance, with an annual average growth of 4.6 per cent between 2000 and 2007, mainly as a result of domestic economic and structural reforms, high commodity prices and external assistance. Since 1998, many African countries have undertaken substantial reforms so as to attract foreign direct investment, especially in making the business environment more competitive. Private capital flows, no longer confined to only one or two countries, surged to $53 billion in 2007, exceeding foreign aid for the first time. Accelerated reforms have yielded stronger macroeconomic stability, fostered growth and made countries more resilient to external shocks. The recent increase in the voting power of African countries in the World Bank governing board recognizes the economic performance of Africa and has the potential to deepen African voices at the global level.

54. While Africa's fiscal situation has improved, there is still a gap in economic infrastructure, and heavy investments in transport and energy are urgently needed to facilitate the growth of industry and to address unemployment rates, which remain in double digits in a large number of African countries. The 1998 economic recipes are being re-evaluated, with African Governments and the donor community focusing more on appropriate regulation rather than deregulation and on promoting agriculture, trade and productive investments.

### 5. Trade

55. Given the low participation of African countries in the multilateral trading system, the 1998 report proposed better access to developed markets, diversification of African exports and the conclusion of a fair global trading regime under the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations. Today, most of the recommendations remain unaddressed primarily because of the delay in concluding the Doha Round. The current global financial crisis, however, has not motivated a broad wave of protectionist measures by developed countries.

56. Africa's trade patterns are being significantly affected by changing relationships with emerging economies in the expanding South-South cooperation process. The increasing South-South trade and the political and economic presence of emerging economies on the continent provide an opportunity for Africa to diversify not only its trade but also its access to technical assistance, external funding and knowledge under the solidarity principle. South-South partnerships serve as good examples of knowledge-management and knowledge-sharing among developing countries.

57. Despite these opportunities, Africa's position in global trade is still marginal, accounting for an average of 3.2 per cent of world imports and 3 per cent of world exports, despite the increasing demand for natural resources by emerging economies. It is necessary to revisit the inequities that prevail in the global trade regime, in particular the provision of subsidies to certain sectors by economically powerful countries, which cause African exporters to be put at a disadvantage. The use of technical barriers, including sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, also impede export growth and development in Africa. In this regard, the Aid for Trade initiative has been progressively contributing to Africa's ability to exploit existing and potential future trading opportunities. African countries, however, have received the lowest level of trade-related aid relative to total aid among large aid recipients. The impact of the initiative on Africa could be further increased if more Aid for Trade funds were allocated for least developed and low-income countries. Mainstreaming trade into national development plans and promoting capacity-building for trade support institutions will ensure the sustainability of the support provided to Africa. **More attention needs to be focused on trade facilitation, including customs and port reforms and the reduction of transport costs.**

58. In addition to increased meaningful market access, supply-side constraints need to be addressed in order to enable African countries to take advantage of trade opportunities. The lack of diversification, with many countries specializing only in a small number of primary commodities, and competitiveness of African economies is another major impediment. African economies need to place greater emphasis on regional trade, industrialization and diversification rather than on primary commodities whose prices tend to be volatile. **I urge that tariffs on products of export interest to African countries be eliminated, either autonomously or through the expeditious conclusion of the Doha Round, and that there be appropriate development provisions. Leading trading nations should consider making the necessary arrangements to ensure that the modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market access are adopted and that the long-overdue Doha Round be concluded as soon as possible.**

### 6. Regional integration

59. Africa has committed itself to the goal of economic integration through the creation of an African Economic Community, building upon the existing structures of the regional economic communities. Regional economic integration processes and intra-African trade hold the key to sustainable development by accelerating the transformation of fragmented economies and expanding markets and they are critical to enhancing Africa's competitiveness at the international level. However, poor transportation linkages between countries, as well as many other constraints, hinder expansion for trading. Intra-African trade remains very low, at 9.5 per cent of Africa's total merchandise trade in 2007.

60. The African Economic Community will require strong political will and the mobilization of resources and investments in infrastructure as well as facilitation of the removal of barriers to trade and to the exchange of goods and services. In 2008, the African Union signed a memorandum of understanding with the regional economic communities, which defines the areas of cooperation. However, there is a need for greater clarity on burden-sharing between the African Union and the regional economic communities.

61. The memorandum of understanding among the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the SADC and the East African Community in 2008 for the eventual creation of a single free trade area and the merger of the organizations reinforces the objective of the African Union to accelerate integration. The memorandum of understanding is also part of the African Union objective to rationalize the regional economic communities in order to reduce the possible duplication of efforts.

62. The regional economic communities confront serious capacity problems in meeting their core mandates. Even though the successful implementation of the African Union Strategic Plan (2009-2012) relies largely on the regional economic communities and on Member States for its implementation, cooperation between the African Union and the regional economic communities has yet to be fully realized. UNDP, the World Bank, the International Trade Centre and the Department of Political Affairs, among others, are already actively engaged in strengthening regional and pan-African institutions. **The United Nations system will strengthen and rationalize its cooperation with the regional economic communities, with due regard to the African Union strategic plan, NEPAD and the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme.**

### 7. Aid, external debt and international assistance

63. The ability of African countries to seek internal coherence on global questions and the efforts of multilateral donors to seek African inputs into international decision-making has resulted in an improved coordination of efforts and mutual accountability. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action and other internationally agreed development goals have had a major impact in Africa. The Group of Eight has established an Africa action plan to support Africa's development, through the Africa Partnership Forum, by establishing partnerships guided by the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the Bretton Woods institutions have set up several initiatives to ease the debt burden of a number of countries.

64. Following the June 2005 Group of Eight summit held in Gleneagles, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, $40 billion worth of debt owed by 18 countries was cancelled under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Fourteen of the countries are in Africa, and the debt cancellation has enabled them to redirect resources used for debt repayments to fund health, education and infrastructure programmes. In 2007 official development assistance stood at $39 billion; in 2008 it rose to $44 billion. However, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 has put budgetary pressures on developed countries, preventing them from meeting their aid commitments. Progress under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative has allowed for

greater fiscal space for some African countries. The concern remains, however, that a number of African countries are still facing severe difficulties in finding a durable solution to their external debt problems and that this could adversely affect their capacity to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. **I call for continued efforts to achieve long-term debt sustainability for these countries and for development partners to fulfil their commitments.**

65. It is also necessary to recommit to improving the effectiveness of development assistance, including the fundamental principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability and to reassess the harmful developmental impact of trade, agricultural and other policies. Development assistance strategies should include additional aid for trade in its broadest definition, including financial and technical assistance, foreign direct investment and productive value chain inclusion. United Nations development assistance frameworks should be further aligned with the priorities of NEPAD and of the African Union and with national and international resource mobilization strategies for poverty alleviation, and development should contribute to reaching African Union priorities**. I call for a continuing dialogue to improve the effectiveness of aid, including the full implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action by countries and organizations that have committed to them.**

66. In its resolution 63/1, the General Assembly adopted the political declaration on Africa's development needs. In accordance with the resolution, I will submit to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session a report on an improved monitoring mechanism to survey the full and timely implementation of the various commitments made by Africa and the international community. The incomplete fulfilment of donor commitment to scaling up official development assistance has become one of the limiting constraints on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Some countries, however, have proved that meeting the official development assistance commitment is possible despite the global economic crisis. It is now time to deliver on the pledges and promises made to Africa.

## 8. Managing public health challenges

67. Funding for and political attention directed to the health sector by United Nations entities, Member States and non-traditional donors has increased rapidly in recent years, and African Heads of State and Government have pledged to increase the health budget by 15 per cent per year under the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases, adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 2001. Since its formation in 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has channelled $3.3 billion in grants to Africa, and there has been increased ownership of health challenges by African countries. However, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other chronic diseases continue to take a heavy toll in human lives and prevent many Africans from fulfilling their potential. In 2009, 1.8 million children in Africa under the age of 15 were living with HIV. Drug abuse and the high risk of an HIV/AIDS infection among injecting drug users is already a serious concern.

68. Public health successes include the elimination of river blindness and leprosy, and substantive transmission control of polio, guinea worm and measles. Nevertheless, acute shortages of trained health personnel, equipment and facilities and limited investment in research continue to impede efforts to confront health

epidemics and reach the health-related Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Almost all maternal deaths and at least two thirds of all child deaths are preventable. While a few countries in Africa have shown improvements in reducing child mortality and in improving maternal health, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole lags far behind in meeting Goals 4 and 5. Achieving the Goals on access to reproductive health supplies and on improved water and sanitation facilities remains a challenge. **In support of the African Health Strategy 2007-2015, health-related global initiatives and partnerships must be harmonized in order to strengthen health systems, identifying gaps in coverage and quality of care and addressing critical bottlenecks.**

## C. Promoting human rights

69. Human rights have been placed at the core of the governance and democracy agendas in Africa. The Constitutive Act of the African Union has made a firm commitment to their promotion and protection in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Act enshrines the principles of gender equality, respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance and the promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development.

70. Fifty-one African States have signed or ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the entire continent is now party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although universal ratification and full implementation of all international human rights instruments has yet to be achieved. All African countries have ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and since its adoption in 1998, 48 countries have signed the protocol establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. In 2004, the African Union opted to merge the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights into the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, when it is finally constituted. A protocol establishing the merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted in 2008 and is awaiting signature and ratification by African Union member States. At the subregional level, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the East African Community Court of Justice and the Southern African Development Community Tribunal specifically deal with human rights concerns.

71. Equally significant is the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. These international efforts inspired the establishment in 2002 of the International Criminal Court, signalling the birth of a new age of accountability. Thirty African countries have acceded to the Rome Statute. The Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, all States parties to the Rome Statute, have themselves referred situations occurring on their territories to the International Criminal Court, while the situation in Darfur has been referred to the Court by the Security Council. In March 2010, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation *proprio motu* into the situation of Kenya. **I encourage States to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court and to implement their obligations under the complementarity principle, and I encourage those who have not ratified the Rome Statute to do so.**

72. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has significantly increased its presence in Africa, with 23 field offices to

assist Governments in their efforts to fight impunity and discrimination, protect the rights of victims, address inequalities and strengthen the judiciary, and human rights feature centrally in many peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in Africa. At the global level, the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council offers an opportunity to establish a dialogue between the Human Rights Council, Governments, the United Nations and other organizations about creating the necessary frameworks, resources and practices to advance and protect human rights in a specific country.

73. Serious concerns remain, however. In a number of countries, law enforcement agencies have been implicated in human rights violations, and impunity has been further exacerbated by weak legal, judicial and representative institutions. The inability or unwillingness of the State to ensure the protection of human rights, lack of resources for the police, courts, prison systems and human rights bodies, flawed administration of justice, political influence in judicial processes and corruption in public services threaten the legitimacy of legal and judicial processes and deny people their right to legal remedy. Discrimination and continuing inequalities, including with regard to minority and vulnerable groups, mass violations of human rights committed by the State, lack of equal access to public goods and services, and gender-based violence and discrimination against women and girls are practices that continue to challenge Africa's new political and social vision. **I call on Member States to strengthen mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and to ensure accountability for human rights violations as well the protection of human rights defenders.**

74. The evolution of the African human rights system in the next decade will largely depend on the courage and determination of African human rights advocates, the willingness of the African Union and regional organizations and the ability of individual African countries to live up to their obligations, including the provision of adequate financial and human resources for the functioning of human rights bodies. The voice of civil society is making itself louder on matters of civil and human rights, and the advent of a new media has also had a positive impact. Ongoing support for the development of a human rights strategy for Africa, which will be presented at the African Union summit to be held in January 2011, is a key element of the OHCHR contribution to the implementation of the human rights aspects of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union.

### 1. Protecting civilians in situations of armed conflict

75. The Security Council has long debated the protection of civilians as a thematic issue, adopting its first resolution on the issue in 1999 (1265 (1999)) and six other resolutions to ensure respect of and adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties to armed conflict. Since 1999, the Security Council has also increasingly mandated its peacekeeping operations to protect civilians and has repeatedly reaffirmed that protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources. Humanitarian actors have stepped up their activities to enhance the protection of civilians, including by reaching out to all parties to the conflict to enhance their respect for international humanitarian law and to allow for timely and unimpeded access by humanitarian convoys and personnel to vulnerable populations. For its part, the African Union peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia have become increasingly involved in the protection of civilians.

76. Unfortunately, the condition of civilians in many armed conflicts has worsened, with civilians, especially women, children and the most vulnerable among communities, being purposely targeted, subjected to abusive treatment or being used by the warring parties to the conflict, including members of national security forces. A lack of compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and the impunity of those who have committed crimes remain key challenges.

77. The United Nations is determined to ensure that the rights of civilians caught in conflicts are protected. In my report on implementing the responsibility to protect (A/63/677), I reaffirmed that prevention should be the priority, requiring a balanced and nuanced approach and a strengthening of regional arrangements. Although the issue continues to generate controversy, it is crucial to keep the dialogue going, building on what has been achieved and setting markers for the future in order to erase the complacency and cynicism that has often prevented the United Nations from acting as early or effectively as it should.

### 2. Children affected by armed conflict

78. In 1996, I appointed my first Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict as a result of the 1996 Graça Machel report on the impact of armed conflict on children, which concluded that in war all the rights to which children are entitled are violated and that as long as the world tolerates the situation, every one of us is complicit. Today, grave violations against children continue to be committed by both State and non-State parties in a conflict, despite the comprehensive and robust normative frameworks that are in place for their protection.

79. The subject of children and armed conflict has been firmly placed on the agenda of the Security Council. In its resolution 1612 (2005), the Council decided to establish a dedicated working group on children and armed conflict to review reports of the Secretary-General on the situations of concern listed in the annual thematic reports. The Council has called on parties to a conflict that recruit and use children to enter into action plans with the United Nations for their immediate release and reintegration and has also called for the establishment of a monitoring and reporting system on grave violations against children. In its resolution 1882 (2009), the Council introduced two new triggers, patterns of sexual violence and killing and maiming of children, for the listing of parties in the annexes to the annual reports of the Secretary-General on the issue.

80. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and its Optional Protocols (2000) on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1999), the Paris Principles (2007) and the seven Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict, including resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), reflect increased global awareness about deliberate violations against children. Gaps continue to exist, however, in the implementation and monitoring of these norms. Governments in Africa are taking leadership in these areas. In the 2010 N'Djamena Declaration, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and the Sudan made a pledge to stop the use of children in armed conflict and to strive, institutionally and through concrete actions, for the release and reintegration of children. **I call on all stakeholders to renew efforts to meet these challenges.**

### 3. Refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons

81. Africa hosts large numbers of persons displaced by conflict or other causes, requiring increasingly well-coordinated United Nations and African Union structures to respond to their protection needs. Since 2000, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa in order to ensure continued support for a durable solution for displaced people. In 2005, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started a strengthening protection capacity project to facilitate national responses to protection problems within the framework of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme and has been working with the African Union to strengthen its response and planning capacity.

82. Over the past decade, the number of refugees in sub-Saharan Africa has dropped from 3.4 million in 2000 to 2.1 million in January 2010. Challenges remain however, in finding solutions for the refugees, the majority of whom have been trapped in exile for protracted periods of time. The identification and protection of refugees in the context of mixed-migratory flows represents an added challenge. Refugees and migrants are on the move within the region, not only out of Africa. In 2009, South Africa was by far the world's leading recipient of new asylum claims, with some 220,000 applications filed.

83. The downward trend in refugee numbers is tempered by the 11.6 million internally displaced persons on the continent, more than 40 per cent of the world's internally displaced persons. Much progress has been made in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons since the introduction of the inter-agency cluster approach in 2006, but more needs to be done. The adoption in October 2009 of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), which was signed by 28 African States and ratified by 1 as at the end of June 2010, is a very encouraging development. The Convention calls on Governments to recognize that people displaced within their own country have specific vulnerabilities and must be supported. **I encourage all Member States of the African Union to sign and ratify the Kampala Convention as a matter of priority and to support implementation of the recommendations of the African Union ministers in charge of forced displacement matters for the protection and assistance of refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.**

84. The international community has begun to recognize and address the problem of statelessness in Africa, an important protection concern and potentially destabilizing factor in peacebuilding efforts. Since stateless persons are usually not registered or granted legal status, quantifying the scope of the problem is more difficult than with other populations, although UNHCR and its partners are taking steps to address the issue.

### 4. Eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against women

85. All but two African States have ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. The Southern African Development Community Declaration on Gender and Development and its 1998 Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children and the ECOWAS 2005 gender policy seek to address

issues of gender inequality and women's empowerment. While some progress has been made in reducing gender inequalities, gender-based discrimination is a reality throughout much of Africa, reflecting differences in resources, political will and cultural attitudes towards women.

86. Chronic poverty, intergenerational cycles of violence and abusive practices, and the lack of control over and access to reproductive health services, education or employment continue to undermine the advancement of women. Nearly 58 per cent of the estimated 25 million Africans infected by HIV/AIDS are women and girls. Despite Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), in which the Council recognized the major role of women in preventing and resolving conflict and as agents of peace, women continue to be left out of peace processes. At present, only six African countries have achieved more than 30 per cent representation by women in national legislatures. A common feature of the leading four countries on this indicator (Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa) is that they have emerged from conflict or civil war. This is an indication that we can turn the threats of conflicts into development-focused opportunities in the continent.

87. Systematic rape and sexual violence against women and children in the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and northern Uganda have become tools of retribution, social control or collective punishment. In its resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009), the Council recognized the widespread use of sexual violence as an instrument of conflict. I have committed the United Nations to strengthen its work and the effectiveness of its interventions against gender-based violence and gender discrimination of women and girls with the appointment of my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

88. Gender issues are at the core of the United Nations mandate. Peace and security, development and human rights will find no application and success unless women are an integral, equal and participatory part of those processes. The African Union has declared 2010-2020 as the Decade of Women in Africa. On 2 July 2010, the General Assembly decided to establish a United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women to address fragmentation by initiating stronger coherence and coordination at all levels. **I call on the international community and African Member States to strengthen the capacity of "UN Women" at the country level in order to enable it to effectively support the implementation of Africa's own commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment.lotusw0rd**

# III. Addressing challenges and harnessing emerging opportunities

89. The 1998 report was based on the premise that Africa had the solutions to its own problems. Today, we are witnessing the increased capacity and assertiveness of African countries and organizations to manage their own challenges and to take advantage of the continent's opportunities. Africa is on the move.

90. It is now necessary to ensure that the engagement of the United Nations in Africa responds to the needs and the vision of the continent. **A comprehensive debate on some of the issues raised will be necessary in the General Assembly in order to guide the work of the United Nations in Africa in the coming years.**

91. Opportunities for peace and development in Africa will depend on the strength of African States to perform their roles effectively. Global threats and dynamics need to be considered as the twenty-first century ushers in new transnational challenges. Demographic shifts, financial crises and geopolitical changes, which are moving the pole of political and economic decision-making from North to South and from West to East, will influence Africa's engagement with the international community and the nature of United Nations efforts in the continent. Africa is indeed mobilizing itself to address future challenges, such as climate change, and is driving its own agenda.

## A. The causes of conflict

### 1. Social exclusion, poverty and corruption

92. Inter-State conflicts have declined in number; however, they are being supplanted by smaller-scale, low-intensity conflicts within States that are triggered by the systematic exclusion of significant portions of society from institutions of political governance and from access to key economic assets and social services, such as education and health care. Africa faces the challenge of managing its diversity and addressing the entrenched patterns of exclusion that have led to unresolved challenges, including in respect of citizenship and identity, gender-based, inter-ethnic and interreligious clashes and the targeted segregation of specific ethnic, religious or social communities.

93. Countries facing stark inequality, with weak institutions, and poor countries or countries facing economic collapse are at increased risk of armed conflict. Inequalities in such components of human development as educational attainment also contribute to that risk. As social inequalities increase, social tensions in fragile States may incite conflicts at the local, national and regional levels.

94. Political patronage, identity politics and corruption pose additional threats to social cohesion, marginalizing large groups of people or limiting their participation in decision-making processes, which may lead to a widening disconnect between Governments and their citizens. External influences from Governments and private commercial firms continue to play a role in fuelling or sustaining conflicts. International terrorism also poses new risks. Africa has adopted a regional convention on counter-terrorism and has set up a regional centre in Algiers, the African Centre on Counter-Terrorism, to help mobilize collective action against the threat.

### 2. Armed groups

95. Armed conflict has become more fluid and less easily defined. While most countries are no longer engaged in inter-State warfare, some are hosts to one or more conflicts involving non-State actors. These pose new threats to civilians and often involve ill-trained combatants or armed groups that deliberately target women and children, including through the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war. Such groups may be motivated by political grievances, economic exploitation or opportunistic greed, such as the control of illicit trade routes, and are in some cases under the sway of transnational organized crime. Negotiations are difficult in the absence of interlocutors who can commit their troops or constituencies. Even when a peace settlement is reached, post-agreement violence is frequent and implementation is difficult since leaders may have little authority over their troops.

### 3. Organized crime

96. International organized crime, trafficking in persons and illicit drug trafficking are major threats to peace and security. Illegal activities may become a source of funding for insurgent groups that are able to threaten the political and democratic institutions of a State and pose a risk to the stability and security of countries at the regional and global levels. Countries facing the challenges of recovery and peacebuilding and having weak rule-of-law institutions and large uncontrolled borders are fertile soil for the proliferation of illicit activities controlled by criminal groups. The activities of such groups threaten the democratic processes and the very integrity of the State structures in some African countries.

### 4. Conflicts over natural resources

97. Although the link between natural resources and political conflict is well documented, such conflicts are now aggravated by more exclusive ethnic and regionalist claims. In the Sahel or the Horn of Africa, wars over resources have increased in part as a result of desertification and declining pastures. Land ownership remains a key area of potential tension. Large segments of the population are unable to legally own property, and many women and children have difficulties in claiming their land rights after the death of a male household head. Access to land and secure tenure rights on land especially for refugees and internally displaced persons may contribute to the stabilization of areas affected by displacement. Turbulence arising from the competition for scarce natural resources reaches across national borders. The production, trade and distribution of proceeds from the exploitation of timber and/or minerals in particular have played a major role in fuelling political conflict. **It is essential that the role of natural resources (including access to land and secure tenure rights to land, water, biodiversity and raw materials, as well as the distribution of proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources) be systematically taken into account in every evaluation of the political conflicts in Africa.**

### 5. City slums and rapid urbanization

98. For the first time, more Africans are living in urban districts than in rural areas. It is projected that by 2030 over 742 million people in Africa will be living in cities, approximately 60 per cent of them in overcrowded, unsanitary and impoverished conditions. Rapid urbanization is exacerbated by the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to urban areas, while national and local authorities have not been prepared for unplanned urban development and have little capacity to provide basic services, including housing, water, sanitation, security and social safety nets. The challenges of urban planning, housing development and service delivery need to be tackled urgently. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme operates in situations of crisis, responding to humanitarian shelter and protection needs while establishing conditions for return and reintegration, and peace and stability. In these conditions, disaster prevention and civilian protection will become as important as post-conflict and post-disaster humanitarian responses. Recognizing the need to respond to this growing phenomenon in terms of refugee protection, in September 2009 UNHCR issued its policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas.

### 6. Maritime security

99. Maritime security in Africa has been largely ignored, yet it is emerging as a dominant issue in Africa's future security architecture as a result of new threats, such as piracy in Eastern Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons in West Africa and opportunistic predation of African fishing resources by international actors. Combating piracy is a priority for international organizations, Governments and the shipping industry. The United Nations, European Union, International Maritime Organization and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have joined efforts to respond to the increasingly serious problem of piracy off the Horn of Africa, including targeted threats against humanitarian shipments, by strengthening the capacity of the police, prosecutors, courts and prisons in the countries in East Africa engaged in the prosecution of piracy. African countries face enormous challenges in building naval and maritime capabilities to protect and police Africa's coasts. **This issue requires sustained attention, such as the encouragement of joint maritime patrols, building the infrastructure for a regional network to combat piracy or forging regional and international strategies for maritime security.**

## B. Responding to conflict

100. The persistent weakness of some States and regions will pose great strategic challenges in the next decades as the African Union, the United Nations and the international community learn how to deal with fragile States.

101. As the gap widens between the twentieth-century peace and security institutions and twenty-first-century security realities, current strategic thinking must focus on ending the short-term stabilization outlook of peace efforts in order to bring long-term developmental and socio-economic dimensions to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. During the past decade, the Security Council has significantly expanded its agenda to consider new elements that have the potential to threaten international peace and security. Within this broader concept of security, the next generation of security challenges will require added emphasis on crisis management, disaster risk reduction strategies, stronger civilian components in peace operations and strengthening the rule of law. At a strategic level, it will be necessary to better sequence security, governance and development efforts, especially within the peacebuilding perspective, and to reach out to new partners.

102. New cooperation mechanisms, based on the principle of partnership with African countries and institutions, may be expanded and reinforced. Ensuring that the African Union effectively fulfils its mandate is the primary responsibility of African States. **I call on the international community to provide adequate support to African-led strategies in line with the priorities of the African Union and NEPAD, including, specifically, those identified in the African Union/NEPAD African Plan of Action 2010-2015 and the African Union Strategic Plan 2009-2012.**

### 1. Strengthening the State

103. Confidence in the authority and legitimacy of the State are essential. This in turn depends on the capacity of the State to deliver and on traditional sources of political and social legitimacy. Today, States are trying out different models of governance to see which best serve the peace and development needs of their citizens.

104. We have sometimes placed unrealistic expectations on institution-building, realizing that it may take generations to create a functioning State. It is necessary to pace the timing of interventions and reverse the tendency to overload the reform agenda in fragile States to ensure that structural reforms do not themselves become a source of conflict. Dialogue with the country concerned is essential in order to identify those areas and reforms that can move faster and those that should not. We need to accept that some countries are at different stages in their democratic evolution and recognize that conflict changes many of the assumptions on which we rely.

105. The responsibility of the State in terms of its citizens can be strengthened by supporting the development of subnational systems of governance. If supported by adequate policy and legal frameworks and resources, local authorities can advance the participation of communities in the local development process, enhance social cohesion and promote local conflict resolution mechanisms. **In order to tackle Africa's diverse challenges, the international community, in partnership with Africa, should prioritize strengthening the capacity of the State, including local governments.**

## 2. Preventing and managing conflict

106. Preventing armed conflict is a core component of the United Nations mandate. As the actors and the settings change, however, we must approach conflict prevention and conflict resolution with a higher degree of flexibility. A coherent conflict prevention strategy will necessarily link financial, trade and economic policy to political instruments for conflict management.

107. Strengthening the culture of prevention requires resources. **Appropriate financial mechanisms should be established to assist States in fragile or vulnerable situations in strengthening their national institutions in order to increase their capacity for conflict prevention through governance, social and economic support programmes.**

108. In view of the emergence of more capable mediation actors at the regional and subregional levels, including women's groups, we must reassess and adjust our own approach and engagements, particularly through building national peace infrastructures such as the mediation capacities of countries and civil society organizations. Mediation efforts must be led by national or local stakeholders, with discrete but targeted assistance from the United Nations system and other partners. As part of United Nations support to State-building, the UNDP State-building project has been supporting electoral violence prevention, working with Governments and civil society organizations to build capacities for dialogue, conflict prevention and conflict management before, during and after elections. The positive impact of this approach in Ghana and Lesotho should provide important pointers towards building specific national and local capacities for conflict prevention.

109. As local challenges swell, quick and effective responses will be increasingly needed. African subregional organizations are often better placed than global bodies to successfully undertake conflict prevention, mediation and resolution activities and to face non-traditional security threats in their regions. With the support of the United Nations system, such as that provided by UNDP, and African Union support, regional economic communities may provide a first response to prevent the spillover effects of localized conflicts. **I call on the United Nations system and other**

**partners to support the cooperation between the African Union and the regional economic communities for conflict prevention and mediation within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union.**

### 3. Responding to organized crime

110. Responding to the operations of criminal organizations requires a concerted effort from the State and its neighbours, especially in the area of border management. Since most conflict-related instruments are designed to deal with national problems, it is necessary to establish transnational mechanisms to respond to organized crime and to strengthen the rule of law in peacebuilding and peacekeeping strategies. The joint West Africa Coast initiative (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Political Affairs/UNOWA/INTERPOL), in support of priority interventions of the ECOWAS Action Plan on drugs and crime, is an example of an effective regional approach. **In order to effectively respond to threats posed by transnational organized crime and to complement existing initiatives, I will consider ways to strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping missions to deal with organized crime.**

111. Africa has experienced more than $1.5 trillion in illegal outflows over the past four decades, most of it to western financial institutions facilitated by a shadow global financial system and money-laundering. Improving and ratifying anti-corruption frameworks and strengthening judicial institutions, dealing with the growing traffic of drugs and other illicit commodities, helping African countries to recover assets lost through criminal activities and preventing human trafficking are areas necessitating further attention. Member States should also consider adopting preventive policies, criminalize offences, enhance international judicial cooperation, especially on tax matters, and establish any other necessary and appropriate mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of international and regional instruments. **I call on Member States, the African Union and the regional economic communities to ratify or accede to and implement all United Nations and African Union instruments against terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking and transnational crime, including in the illegal trade of arms and raw materials such as minerals and timber.**

### 4. Peacekeeping challenges

112. Peacekeeping faces formidable challenges, mismatched resources to successfully respond to its mandate, and in some countries where it operates, minimal political support from local leaders. The role of peacekeepers in protecting civilians, including women and children, with limited resources while confronting armed groups in lawless environments is particularly challenging. Some countries hosting peacekeeping operations have signalled their preference to scale down their military and security components. Suggestions to scale down United Nations troop commitments and shrink existing missions are, in part, driven by peacekeeping processes that have not yielded durable peace or have been unable to adapt to new environments.

113. On 25 May 2010, the Security Council voted to end the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (see resolution 1923 (2000)). The Council has also decided that as of 1 July 2010, the

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which will allow the civilian component of the Mission to work with the Government to consolidate the gains achieved so far (see resolution 1925 (2010)). These developments are having a profound impact on how we understand and conduct peacekeeping in Africa. Although Governments bear the primary responsibility for the security and protection of civilians under international law, I remain concerned that the withdrawal of United Nations forces will expose civilians to more violence and abuses, in both Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and impair the delivery of aid to 430,000 people in the former MINURCAT area. The United Nations, the African Union and international partners need to engage in a collective debate on how to better serve the cause of peace in a context in which African countries and institutions are increasingly affirming their responsibility and willingness to take over peacekeeping, peacemaking and the protection of civilians in their territories.

## C. Promoting socio-economic development and social justice

114. The equitable distribution of resources and income remains a key challenge in many African countries. During the past decade, economic gains have not automatically trickled down and the needs of vulnerable populations have not always been addressed. Effective social safety nets are lacking in most African countries and although Africa proved to be more resilient than expected, the recent global crisis has caused a significant setback in poverty reduction and in reaching the other Millennium Development Goals. It is now time for a renewed focus on ending poverty, promoting sustainable development and attaining the Millennium Development Goals through a gender-sensitive, rights-based approach to development that takes into account the social and political triggers of today's conflicts and Africa's common position on social integration and integrated social strategies. The need to promote socio-economic development in the continent underscores the preparation of the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group recommendations, which were endorsed by the African Union in July 2008 and covered such critical areas as agriculture and food security, education, health, infrastructure and trade facilitation and the national statistical system. The Steering Group is advocating for Governments, development partners and other stakeholders to place attainment of the Goals at the heart of national development strategies.

115. We must place capacity-development of the State at the centre of all our efforts in Africa. Incorporating the perspectives of diverse populations and empowering the disadvantaged and marginalized in the formulation and implementation of development plans and poverty reduction strategies must be part of these efforts. We must also revisit the debate over the economic foundations of state- and nation-building, problems that African countries will continue to have to confront.

116. The Declaration on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation in Africa, adopted by the African Union in 2004, identifies employment creation as an explicit and central objective of the economic and social policy for sustainable poverty alleviation with a view to improving the living conditions of Africans. Investments in economic infrastructure and support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, especially in the critical agrarian sector, will allow an increase in local value added

to Africa's vast natural resources and private sector development. Closer collaboration with the business community, African companies and foreign companies operating in Africa, is essential to ensuring economic growth. Accelerated industrialization and structural transformation are also a precondition to eradicating poverty and minimizing social conflicts and inequality. For this to be effectively achieved, Africa needs to add value to its primary commodities before they are exported in order to command better prices, generate employment and create wealth for Africans. **I call on African States to step up the implementation of the Ouagadougou Plan of Action for promotion of employment and poverty alleviation through the acceleration of employment and decent work programmes for all women and men in their countries.**

### 1. Youth employment and education

117. An estimated 60 per cent of Africa's 1 billion people are under 25 years of age. This has implications for economic growth, social cohesion and political stability. Youth must be regarded as an asset that can contribute to economic, social and political development, as highlighted by the International Year of Youth, which aims at advancing the full and effective participation of youth in all aspects of society. However, urban youth with no job prospects and no opportunities are a pool of potential recruits for militias and armed groups. Severe urban overcrowding and decay, increasing poverty and unemployment, the breakdown of the family and the community, disease, child and youth exploitation, and transnational trafficking and crime are multiplying the severity and range of risks to which young people in African cities are exposed. The United Nations and Africa should craft strategies that mainstream youth in development, conflict management and governance, with particular attention on the development of education programmes and skills for employment, technical and vocational education for marginalized and vulnerable youth, those out of school and the internally displaced. Access to free elementary education is not only a human right but also a development issue, with Goal 2 of the Millennium Development Goals calling for the achievement of universal primary education. The 2000 Initiative entitled "Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments", placed education high on the international development agenda. The basic education in Africa programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization responds to demands for access to complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality. **The United Nations system must effectively mainstream and operationalize policies and programmes aimed at empowering youth and creating the necessary conditions to enable them to fully participate in all aspects of society.**

### 2. Agriculture and food security

118. An estimated 200 million people in Africa are undernourished. Food insecurity is partly exacerbated by population growth, poor control over water use, limited access to land, the impact of disease on livestock and crops, inadequate supply, transport and storage logistics, commodity speculation, conflict and climate change. Underinvestment is at the core of Africa's underdeveloped agricultural sector. The share of official development assistance devoted to agriculture, forests and fisheries fell from 19 per cent in 1980 to 5 per cent today and few African countries spend more than 10 per cent of their national budgets on agriculture. **We need to adopt a**

**comprehensive approach to the most urgent needs, such as the growing demand for food in regional and global markets, and to the long-term development of sustainable food systems that can withstand external shocks, while minimizing the impact of agriculture on forests.** Agriculture also has a central role in promoting broad-based sustainable growth and reducing unemployment. **I encourage African States and the international community to invest in smallholder farmers, particularly women farmers, and to promote the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, which includes the creation of safety nets for the hungry poor and direct interventions to improve nutrition.** Appropriately designed safety nets are critical in fragile contexts. **An annual investment of $25 billion is required to support countries in the preparation of their Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme compacts.**

### 3. Mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and promoting growth

119. Climate change poses long-term challenges not only to development but also to security and human rights. Africa is expected to suffer disproportionately from environmental changes that could further marginalize vulnerable populations, especially women, indigenous populations and the rural poor. Mass migration and displacement especially in the context of governance challenges and continued population growth is another risk, as is limited access to food and water. However, climate change also provides opportunities for job creation and for synergies and innovation around environmental, economic and social development and must be integrated in growth, employment and poverty eradication strategies.

120. Africa needs more and cheaper sustainable energy for its development. Financing and technology will be required to ensure that this need is met with options consistent with climate change mitigation. **I call on international partners to step up the provision of financial, technological and capacity-building assistance to enable African countries to address climate change challenges by, inter alia, enhancing public-private partnerships and putting in place effective adaptation and mitigation strategies, including strengthening access to renewable energy and improving energy efficiency.**

### 4. Remittances and the diaspora

121. Remittances are one of the most important sources of household income for many families in Africa, exceeding official development assistance by a factor of 6. Sixty per cent of the receivers are women. The high transaction cost of remittances, however, limits their potential to become an alternative source of development for Africa. **I call upon the private sector and Governments to work together to facilitate easier processing of remittances.**

122. The perception of migration as a tool for development is still relatively new and controversial. **African Governments and institutions need to integrate migration policies into development strategies in order to enhance the impact of remittances and the effective mobilization and utilization of the resources of their diaspora for economic development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and to encourage the active participation of the diaspora in the development of their countries.** The regional economic communities should

consider promoting migrant integration, reintegration and intraregional labour circulation as part of their regional economic integration and cooperation agendas.

### 5. Improving data, statistics and information and communication technologies

123. Statistics are essential to supporting the formulation, implementation and monitoring of development plans and strategies, conducting reliable censuses critical to governance and service delivery, and monitoring development outcomes and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and the objectives of NEPAD. **I call on all stakeholders, in particular the Commission of the African Union and the African Development Bank, to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations system in intensifying their efforts to support the development of statistical capacity across the continent.** It is also critical to provide assistance to the African Union in monitoring and evaluating its own programmes and the programmes funded by partners in order to assess their impact and to ensure alignment with their own priorities.

124. Information and communication technologies can greatly assist in promoting development and social cohesion in Africa. **I call on all countries to fulfil their commitments regarding technological transfers to Africa and to increase their technical cooperation with African countries.**

## IV. Mobilizing resources and partners

125. The recommendations of the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group, which were adopted by the African Union in July 2008, explicitly show that implementation is critical to making appreciable progress on the Millennium Development Goals in the continent, while stressing the imperative of addressing implementation gaps in Africa. The Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group, through its working group, has delved extensively into bridging the implementation gaps. It has focused extensively on mobilizing experts and resources for effective implementation of the Goals in Africa. It is proposing a comprehensive implementation package of action points covering: (a) the use of the recommendations with other African Union initiatives as the catalytic basis for an Africa Millennium Development Goals action plan; (b) the creation of an African regional working group that will focus primarily on implementation of the Goals at the national and regional levels; and (c) the use of macroeconomically and sectorally sound investment plans of unfunded Millennium Development Goals interventions in national development strategies in order to mobilize resources through round-table discussions at the global and national levels. **I will proactively engage the institutional members of the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group and the United Nations system to support the African Union in promoting a comprehensive implementation package with a view to accelerating Millennium Development Goals progress in Africa.**

126. The capacity of the State to deliver depends to a great extent on its ability to mobilize national resources and to achieve greater ownership of the budgeting process. Some countries have made reforms that have enabled them to widen the tax base and increase tax revenue. Other areas that require improvement are the management of revenue from natural resources and finding ways to increase the development impact of remittances. Better mobilization of domestic resources

would reduce the risk of countries being overly dependent on donor support and lacking effective control over their national budgets.

127. In mobilizing resources, it is critical to build a coalition for action, which along with traditional donors, would include Africa's new strategic partners, civil society, philanthropic organizations, the private sector, the media, regional and subregional institutions and the African diaspora. Governments are increasingly looking to public-private partnerships to improve infrastructure networks and enhance service delivery. The United Nations Office for Partnerships and the 23 local networks of the Global Compact in Africa have encouraged a number of public-private partnerships and socially responsible investments, with a focus on Africa's development needs, and have worked with the African Union to engage private sector and foundation leaders to promote multi-stakeholder partnerships. It is also important to ensure that the practices and priorities of new partners are appropriately aligned with country assessments and priorities and internationally agreed standards and norms.

128. Civil society's influence has grown significantly since 1998. However, a key challenge remains: that of domestic resource mobilization and fundraising abroad, which often leads to the impression that civil society in Africa is driven by external influence. New donors, including private foundations, can mobilize significant economic resources in support of national and local policies at the local level. **I will engage the United Nations system in developing and implementing an effective strategy for promoting and strengthening national and international civil society partnerships, particularly in post-conflict countries.**

129. The emergence of new actors, such as Brazil, China, India and Turkey, has been important in expanding Africa's opportunities and resources. They offer new sources of investment, especially within the growing South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation processes. However, this does not diminish the responsibility of traditional donors to deliver on their promises. African countries have formed alliances with emerging economies to mobilize for United Nations reforms, particularly in revitalizing the role of the General Assembly and in expanding the Security Council.

130. African participation in global institutions such as the Group of Eight and Group of Twenty has kept the African economic agenda on the global table. Although this participation has contributed to reducing fears about the marginalization of Africa, it remains to be seen whether Africa's role in the new institutions of global governance will enhance its collective voice in global affairs or if selective invitation could actually fragment Africa's positions.

## V. A new engagement with Africa

131. Africa's leadership and political will, social progress, sustained economic growth and governance reforms are slowly changing perceptions of the continent in today's world. Whereas the impact of violent conflicts and poverty in Africa should not be underestimated, it is necessary to engage with the continent in a new way that recognizes the rapid changes Africa is undergoing. We need to help Africa move forward by assisting in changing the discourse around it, acknowledging national and regional commitments and talking about opportunities as well as challenges, while acknowledging the existence of the many different realities in the continent.

132. What is now needed is not a renewal of the pledges but effective implementation of the commitments made, considering the changing environment and the increased capacity of African Governments and institutions to perform their obligations as effective partners. The United Nations system must acknowledge its own limitations. We must assess our comparative advantages and establish the appropriate partnerships to enhance the capacity of regional organizations as leading actors in peace, relief and development and support the role of States and local authorities in providing stability, jobs and security for their people.

133. The causes and triggers of conflict are multiple and interconnected and none of them can be faced alone. Creating a common strategic framework to reach a consensus on the priorities to be addressed and the areas that have the greatest potential for a multiplier effect is thus critical. This should include a more systematic appreciation for the political economy of armed conflicts, especially those linked to natural resources, and the social and gender-based dimensions of violence. We must ensure sufficient capacity within the United Nations system for conflict-sensitive programming at the country level by engaging with national political governance issues. Developing measurable goals on the prevention of conflict and armed violence will offer the opportunity to integrate security-related themes into the possible follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals after 2015.

134. A security policy that has people, development and social issues at its core recognizes that all efforts at peace and development ultimately hinge on the ability of countries to provide the minimum conditions for human sustenance. Going forward, United Nations interventions will require a simultaneous focus on peace, humanitarian needs and development and a more methodological approach that better integrates the national and international partners involved in humanitarian, development, economic, social and human rights agendas.

135. Working alongside African Governments and institutions, the United Nations system has an important role to play. It must be flexible, innovative, coordinated and responsive to the needs, priorities and vision of Africa and its people. This calls for effective delivery of programmes in the field, learning from recent coordination arrangements at the country level, aimed at increasing United Nations coherence, as well as from One United Nations Initiative pilot countries, partnerships with regional organizations on the continent, the strengthened United Nations Development Group Africa structures and subregional coordination mechanisms.

136. Today's fast changing environment has prompted the United Nations to reassess many of the assumptions of the past decades. The need to combat short-term thinking is now greater than ever. Our engagement in Africa must be proactive and aligned with the views, visions and expectations of the African people. It is now time to revisit the effectiveness of our strategies, assess the impact of current policies, map out the actors and institutions that are critical to mobilizing resources to meet the challenges that remain and take advantage of new opportunities. **I will engage the United Nations system through the United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Africa, chaired by my Special Adviser on Africa, to reflect on United Nations system approaches to many of the issues raised in the present report and to further consult with relevant partners.**

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Item 99 (h), (m) and (z) of the provisional agenda*
**General and complete disarmament**

# Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures

# Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them

# The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

## Report of the Secretary General

*Summary*

The present report describes activities undertaken by States and regional and subregional organizations to consolidate peace through practical disarmament measures.

It also summarizes the activities undertaken at the national, regional and subregional levels by the United Nations, and by States and organizations that are in a position to do so, to provide assistance to States in their efforts to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and in collecting and disposing of them.

In addition, it provides an overview of the implementation, by the United Nations system and Member States, of General Assembly resolution 64/50, on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including the work of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

* A/65/150.

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During the reporting period, there was heightened recognition, at the global level, of the importance of assessing the effectiveness of assistance provided to States in the area of small arms. Significantly, this issue was also noted in the outcome document of the Fourth Biennial Meeting, which was adopted by consensus. The meeting was held at New York from 14 to 18 June 2010.

Acknowledgement that the issue of small arms and light weapons must be addressed through a wider, multisectoral lens is found in diverse, related processes such as discussions on an arms trade treaty and initiatives on armed violence and development.

The present report covers the period from August 2009 to July 2010, except for the section on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, which covers the period from August 2008 to July 2010.

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# I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 63/62, entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures", the General Assembly welcomed the activities undertaken by the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures, as well as the synergies within the multi-stakeholder process, including Governments, the United Nations system, regional and subregional organizations and institutions as well as non-governmental organizations in support of practical disarmament measures and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.[1] The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to submit, at its sixty-fifth session, a report on the implementation of practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration the activities of the Group of Interested States in this regard.

2. By its resolution 64/30, entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them", the General Assembly invited the Secretary-General and those States and organizations that are in a position to do so to continue to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them and, to this end, encouraged cooperation among State organs, international organizations and civil society in support of programmes and projects. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to continue to consider the matter and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

3. By its resolution 64/50, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", the General Assembly called upon all Member States to contribute towards the continued implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects at the national, regional and global levels. It also called upon all States to implement the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (the International Tracing Instrument)[2] and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution.

4. The present report is submitted pursuant to the requests made by the General Assembly in the above-mentioned resolutions. To enable a coherent approach to these overlapping and interconnected issues, the three resolutions are addressed together.

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[1] *See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001* (A/CONF.192/15), chap. IV, para. 24.

[2] A/60/88 and Corr. 2, annex; see also General Assembly decision 60/519.

# II. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them; and implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

## A. United Nations system

### 1. The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission

5. The Security Council discusses small arms in relation to thematic issues that have implications for peace and security, such as the protection of civilians in armed conflicts; women, and peace and security; and children in armed conflict. The Council has repeatedly noted with concern the changing character of war and conflict, which threatens the protection of such vulnerable groups as women and children. The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, with their relatively easy operability, has exacerbated this trend and has led to serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. In a number of country resolutions, the Council has raised its concerns about the detrimental impact of the proliferation of small arms on the security of civilians.

6. Arms embargoes constitute the Security Council's principal instrument for curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and their massive use in conflict and non-conflict settings impedes the actions undertaken or supported by the Security Council to enhance security and development. This is particularly significant in such areas as humanitarian aid, violence and crime prevention, protection of the rights of children and youth, peacekeeping, economic development, public health, good governance, human rights and the countering of organized crime and terrorism.

7. The Peacebuilding Commission focuses on marshalling resources and advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. As the Commission is tasked with overseeing the transition of countries from conflict to sustainable development, it might be useful to further increase efforts to address small arms control issues in its country-specific configurations, in particular since levels of small arms in circulation tend to be highest in countries emerging from conflict.

#### Activities undertaken on the issue of small arms and light weapons

8. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council maintains a number of sanctions committees to enforce arms embargoes. An important part of sanctions regimes is to prohibit States and non-State actors from supplying arms and related materiel, and from providing related technical training or assistance to States, non-State actors, regions, individuals or entities. Experts groups or panels, mandated by the Security Council to monitor the implementation of arms embargoes in respective States on the ground, carry out their mandate through on-site visits, and the inspection of and investigation into suspected shipments and the use of arms and ammunition by both Government forces and private actors.

9. During the reporting period, such experts groups reported continued trafficking of arms, including small arms and light weapons, through various means and channels, including land, air and sea, to the States under arms embargoes. Experts groups highlighted the following as sources of arms and ammunition acquisition by non-Government forces: leakage of government stocks from both targeted States and neighbouring States; the sale of arms by corrupt Government officials; battlefield acquisition of arms and ammunition; and deliberate attacks against military and police individuals, convoys and static positions.

10. The experts groups have made a number of recommendations to improve respective sanctions regimes; many of which correspond to the issues identified under the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. The recommendations include the improvement of marking for imported arms in Liberia; enhanced, preferably computerized, record-keeping in Liberia; the destruction of surplus weapons, effective tracing of weapons and sharing of information in Somalia; and enhanced stockpile management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

11. In its country-specific efforts, the Peacebuilding Commission continued to include small arms-related measures in its work. For example, the Commission's mission to Burundi recommended the adoption of legislation pertaining to small arms and light weapons and the regulation of arms during the election period. Such measures could have a stabilizing effect in post-conflict situations and could potentially be emulated in other post-conflict scenarios.

## 2. General Assembly

### Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

12. The Organization's main instrument for addressing illicit trafficking in small arms is the Programme of Action, adopted in 2001. The Programme of Action sets out a comprehensive framework for a coordinated international response to the problems associated with small arms and light weapons. It establishes international norms and measures to address the small arms issue, and aims to promote its responsible implementation by States. The implementation of the Programme of Action is reviewed biennially through meetings of States, and will be further reviewed by an open-ended meeting of governmental experts in 2011 and a review conference in 2012.

### Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

13. The Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action was held at New York, from 14 to 18 June 2010. The meeting of States also considered the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, adopted in 2005. The meeting adopted its report by consensus. The "way forward" sections in the outcome document of the meeting highlight measures that can be undertaken for the further implementation of the Programme of Action.

14. Consideration of the implementation of the Programme of Action was conducted through discussions centred around the following four themes: border

management, international cooperation and assistance, the International Tracing Instrument and follow-up mechanisms within the Programme of Action. Under "border management", States underscored the need to enhance cooperation among national institutions and to integrate adequate procedures for the prevention of the illicit arms trade in their border control mechanisms. They also recommended convening regional meetings of their relevant law enforcement authorities. Under "international cooperation and assistance", States were encouraged to consider ways to assess the effectiveness of cooperation and assistance, thereby introducing the topic of aid effectiveness in the Programme of Action. Also, States encouraged intensified efforts to identify matches between requests for assistance and available resources. Under the International Tracing Instrument, States highlighted the important role international cooperation and assistance plays in the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, including: training and capacity-building; strengthening of the legal and administrative framework and inter-agency cooperation; and the provision of technology, such as marking machines. States also welcomed the contribution of civil society and industry to the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument. Under "follow-up mechanisms", suggestions for further action included a comprehensive assessment of progress under the Programme of Action in the ten years following its adoption, as an input to the 2012 review conference.

**Activities undertaken on the Implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons**

*United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*

15. In the outcome document of the Third Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action, held in July 2008, States stressed the importance of regional approaches to the implementation of the Programme of Action and the usefulness of convening regional meetings sponsored by interested States and international, regional and subregional organizations in a position to do so, in particular in the years between biennial meetings. States also welcomed a coordinating role by the United Nations, where needed, in setting up such regional meetings.[3] In this connection, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs organized a meeting for States of the Latin American and Caribbean region in Lima (March 2010); a meeting for States of the South-east Asian region in Bali, Indonesia (March 2010); and a meeting for States of the Central African region in Kinshasa (April 2010).[4] At these meetings, States of the respective regions held in-depth discussions on strengthening regional implementation of the Programme of Action, and provided input to the preparation of the fourth Biennial Meeting of States. Progress was also made to elaborate the assistance needs of requesting States with a view to matching needs with resources as mandated in the Outcome Document of the third Biennial Meeting of States.[5]

[3] A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 24, sect. I, para. 6.

[4] Similar meetings were held for States of the Pacific region in Sydney and for States in Southern Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa and bordering States, in Kigali in June and July 2009 respectively. The meetings in 2009 and 2010 were made possible by the following contributors: Austria, France, Japan, Norway and Switzerland; and the following host countries: Australia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Peru and Rwanda (see A/64/173).

[5] A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 24, sect. I, para. 3.

16. In an effort to further promote the International Tracing Instrument, the United Nations and the Czech Republic, in collaboration with INTERPOL and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), organized a capacity-building workshop on the Instrument for ECOWAS States in Prague in September 2009. The workshop was attended by representatives from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, and included discussions on the technical aspects of marking and tracing small arms. The participants also exchanged national experiences on the implementation of measures to curb illicit flows of small arms, and made field visits to weapons and ammunition factories.

*Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate*

17. The adoption by consensus, at the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States, of a way forward on the issue of border management strengthens the work already undertaken by some United Nations entities in this area. Partnerships continue to be developed between United Nations agencies, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and international and regional specialized organizations, including INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, in order to promote relevant norms and practices for the control of weapons.

18. Together with the African Union's African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, the Executive Directorate organized a workshop on enhancing the capacity of West African Member States in the areas of customs, border control and arms trafficking, which was held in March 2010 in Algiers.[6] Representatives of seven States of the region and INTERPOL attended the meeting.

19. In July 2010, the Executive Directorate held a workshop on challenges to effective border control capacity-building in East Africa, which addressed the import, export and transit through customs of small arms, ammunition and explosives, with a view to putting in place measures to prevent smuggling. The strengthening of implementation measures with regard to arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council was also discussed.

*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

20. During the reporting period, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) continued to focus on the issue of assistance to States regarding small arms programming. In June 2010, it published a book entitled *Searching for Aid Effectiveness in Small Arms Assistance*, which assesses existing aid effectiveness frameworks, namely the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and explores their applicability to assistance in the field of small arms and light weapons.

21. Within the reporting time frame, the Institute also completed its checklist, entitled "Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms: a checklist for matching needs and resources", which is a web-based tool designed to help States identify the types of assistance they may require to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.[7]

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[6] Made possible by a contribution from Germany.

[7] See www.poa-iss.org/matching.

*International Civil Aviation Organization*

22. The Aviation Security Panel of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which comprises experts nominated by Member States and representatives of the aviation industry, continues to examine the issue of new and emerging threats, including the threat posed by man-portable air defence systems. The Aviation Security Panel is currently in the process of finalizing an information and airport vulnerability assessment guide on the systems, which is intended to assist Member States in developing a strategy to establish security countermeasures in response to the current and the potential threat posed by such systems. Once finalized, this document will be made available to authorized personnel within States through the ICAO secure website.

## The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects: broader initiatives related to the Programme of Action

23. The subject of small arms is at the nexus of intersecting policy issues, including trade, security, development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, organized crime and public health. Hence, there is a need for a broad, multisectoral approach to deal with this matter. This necessity is explicitly acknowledged in the Programme of Action by its framing of the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons "in all its aspects". At the same time, other processes within the United Nations also address the small arms issue in wider contexts.

### (a) Arms trade treaty

24. While discussions on an arms trade treaty constitute a distinctive, stand-alone process, they are driven by concerns about the impact of unregulated trade in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, on development, human rights and security. A set of commonly agreed international standards for the transfer of conventional arms would specifically address challenges relating to the unregulated trade of conventional arms in terms of their diversion to the illicit market (see A/RES/64/48, twelfth preambular paragraph). Negotiations on an arms trade treaty will be undertaken within the framework of preparatory committee sessions in 2010 and 2011, with a United Nations conference on the arms trade treaty planned for 2012.

### (b) Activities undertaken on the issue of an arms trade treaty

*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

25. Between February 2009 and July 2010, the Institute implemented its first project on an arms trade treaty, funded by the European Union. The project consisted mainly of six regional seminars in different parts of the world (see www.unidir.org). The project facilitated the exchange of views among Member States, regional organizations and civil society on the different aspects of the treaty. In 2010 and 2011, the Institute will organize a second series of regional events.

26. The Institute also organized other activities in support of an arms trade treaty, including several seminars in Geneva, and a symposium in Cairo, in collaboration with the League of Arab States, in June 2010.

### (c) Armed violence and development

27. Armed violence has increasingly been analysed in terms of its economic and social cost to society. Growing recognition that armed violence represents a fundamental challenge to many developmental and humanitarian goals, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, has led to recent States-led initiatives, such as the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, which was adopted in June 2006, and the adoption of the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence in May 2010. These initiatives offer important road maps to addressing the major threat posed by armed violence and conflict to human security and to the hard-won Millennium Development Goal gains (A/64/665, para. 45).

28. Within the United Nations system, a number of entities are now collaborating within the inter-agency Armed Violence Prevention Programme, which aims to promote effective responses to armed violence through the provision of substantive support to the development of international policies and nationally led comprehensive armed violence prevention programmes.

29. The upcoming High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Millennium Development Goals, which will be held in September 2010, will provide an excellent opportunity to emphasize how consistent engagement by States in the prevention and reduction of armed violence can be an effective component in efforts to alleviate poverty and to achieve the Goals.

### (d) Activities undertaken on armed violence and development

30. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) co-organized a regional workshop on "Youth and armed violence in Africa" in Nairobi in December 2009. The workshop aimed at engaging youth leaders and promoting actions to reduce youth involvement in armed violence in Africa. Leaders and activists of youth organizations, as well as Government officials working on youth issues from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania, participated in the workshop.

*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

31. Since 2006, the Security Needs Assessment Protocol project of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has developed an innovative "best process" approach to local programme design in support of work done on armed violence and development. Its purpose is to assist United Nations operational agencies to better generate local cultural knowledge on programming on peace, security and development and to apply that knowledge to programming goals through novel design processes. This pilot project addresses the evident gaps between universal best practices and local field-level realities by placing local project design at the forefront of attention. A pilot is now being completed on children's issues and community-level programming in post-conflict Nepal to help implement the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and consolidate the peace.[8]

[8] www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=337

### 3. United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms

32. The cross-cutting nature of the impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons underscores the importance of coordination on the small arms issue within the United Nations system. To meet this challenge, the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism (CASA), was established as the Secretary-General's coordination platform within the United Nations. The CASA mechanism now brings together 22 United Nations system partners that deal with preventing violence and mitigating the impact of small arms and light weapons on societies, communities and individuals from their particular angle. United Nations system partners assist Member States and regional organizations with their implementation of the Programme of Action.

33. The CASA mechanism covers not only the Programme of Action and its International Tracing Instrument, but also other global small arms-related agreements, including the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It is also the coordinating body within the United Nations on the arms trade treaty.

34. During the reporting period, the CASA mechanism achieved broader participation within the United Nations system. It strengthened its coordination role in the area of small arms culminating in the endorsement of its strategic framework for 2009-2013.

#### Activities undertaken within the United Nations Coordination Action on Small Arms mechanism

*Developing International Small Arms Control Standards*

35. In recent years, the United Nations system has been successful in setting technical standards in such specific thematic areas as mine action and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The CASA mechanism's current flagship initiative is the development of International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The aim is to develop a set of internationally accepted and validated technical standards that provide comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policymakers on legal, policy and operational issues surrounding small arms control. Twenty-six ISACS modules have been drafted and opened as public consultation drafts available online at www.un-casa-isacs.org. The ISACS project will continue into 2011.

*Programme of Action Implementation Support System*

36. The CASA mechanism has enhanced its capacity for information sharing since the Programme of Action Implementation Support System was launched in July 2008 (see www.poa-iss.org). This is an evolving web-based comprehensive information tool that serves as a one-stop shop for providing information on all elements directly relevant to the implementation of the Programme of Action. In the outcome document of the fourth Biennial meeting of States,[9] States welcomed the further development of the Implementation Support System, including a new

[9] Official document to be issued shortly.

web-based template for States to use when reporting on their implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument.

37. In the outcome document of the Third Biennial Meeting of States, States underlined that the value of assistance proposals in the field of small arms would be enhanced if they were formulated as concrete projects with measurable goals and posted on the Implementation Support System.[10] As a follow-up to this, an online tool developed by the Institute to assist States in identifying their assistance needs has been integrated into the implementation support system. Furthermore, a compilation of national assistance proposals from Member States submitted through their 2010 national reports on the Programme of Action was recently prepared by the United Nations[11] as a further step to improving the matching of needs and resources for international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building in the area of small arms and light weapons. This initiative was also welcomed by States at the Fourth Biennial Meeting.

*Developing international ammunition technical guidelines*

38. To effectively combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, it is crucial that the issue of the diversion of small arms and light weapons ammunition into illicit markets also be addressed.

39. One of the main origins of ammunition diversion is the lack of sound management of ammunition stockpiles, either through neglect, lack of resources or corruption. States that do not effectively manage their national stockpiles are unable to monitor the quality and quantity of their stored conventional ammunition. These States are therefore also unable to effectively address the safety and security of these ammunition stockpiles.

40. In 2008, the report of a United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the issue recommended that technical guidelines for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition be developed within the United Nations and made available for use by States on a voluntary basis (see A/63/182, para. 72). The report of the Group was welcomed by all Member States (see General Assembly resolution 63/61). Under the auspices of the CASA mechanism, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, together with the United Nations Mine Action Service and other partner agencies have undertaken to develop and implement international ammunition technical guidelines. Full completion and validation of the guidelines is expected at the end of 2010.

## 4. Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures

41. General Assembly resolution 51/45N, entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures" focused attention on the fact that, in most conflict and post-conflict environments, questions of control of small arms and light weapons, demining, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants are increasingly crucial to effective conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. By establishing the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures, Member States were able to look for ways to provide concrete assistance to those who live in post-conflict situations, to prevent a recurrence of crisis situations and

[10] A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3, para. 24, sect. I, para. 6.

[11] Available from www.poa-iss.org/bms4/.

help construct a new environment of durable peace. Meetings of the Group are open to all States, interested United Nations partners and relevant non-governmental organizations.

42. During the reporting period, the Group held six meetings: December 2008, January 2009, March 2009, October 2009, February 2010 and March 2010.[12] Specific agenda items for these meetings included the preparation of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States; discussions on an arms trade treaty; briefings on the First Committee of the General Assembly; and a presentation on the International Small Arms Control Standards. In October 2009, the Group and the Geneva Process on small arms co-organized a joint meeting in New York to discuss the preparations for the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States.

## B. Activities undertaken at the regional and subregional levels within and outside the United Nations system

### Africa

43. During the reporting period, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa contributed substantively to the development of an African Union strategy to control small arms. The Centre represented the United Nations in the African Union-Regions Small Arms Steering Committee. The Centre also developed cooperative relations with African subregional organizations, notably the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Regional Centre on Small Arms, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization.

44. In Central Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States, was tasked to help draft the Central Africa Convention on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention), which was adopted at the thirtieth ministerial meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in April 2010. In West Africa, the Centre provided assistance to States in harmonizing their legislation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials and is developing a database on national small arms-related legislation, in cooperation with ECOWAS.

45. In parallel with the UNIDIR series of seminars funded by the European Union (see para. 25 above), the Centre co-organized regional seminars on an arms trade treaty for Central, Northern and Western Africa in Lomé, in April 2009, together with the West African Action Network on Small Arms and the International Action Network on Small Arms. It co-organized another for Eastern and Southern Africa in Addis Ababa in December 2009, together with the International Action Network on Small Arms and Oxfam.

[12] Facilitated by Germany.

46. In East Africa, the Centre worked with the Regional Centre on Small Arms to build the capacity of States to identify brokers and developed software for States to register brokers and brokering licences electronically. In Southern Africa, the Centre initiated a partnership with SADC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization, to identify areas of assistance needed by States. Building the capacities of national commissions on small arms and of parliamentarians was also an important aspect of the Centre's work. In addition, it hosted workshops to engage civil society organizations in the arms trade treaty process and to further the establishment of subregional civil society networks.[13]

47. The East African Community reported that, to date, 20,000 arms have been marked in the region and 120,000 publicly destroyed, in part to facilitate the effective implementation of the International Tracing Instrument. Furthermore, since 2010 was designated by the African Union as the "Year of Peace for Africa", the Community held events to reaffirm the commitment of the region to the eradication of illicit arms and to mobilize communities to support law enforcement agencies (see www.eac.int).

48. ECOWAS reported that to date, through the work of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme, 13 out of 15 States members have established national commissions on small arms, while the remaining two States are making progress in transforming their focal committees into national commissions. It was reported that the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme also provided ECOWAS States with such border control equipment as seaport and airport scanners, weapons detection and communication equipment and training.

49. At the same time, the Programme reported having sponsored community-level armed violence reduction projects in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali and Senegal. It also supported arms collection and destruction activities in Ghana and Niger. It was reported that 11 out of 15 States have ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials, which entered into force on 29 September 2009. As a follow-up, a plan of action for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention for the period 2011 to 2015 was adopted at the sixty-fourth session of the council of ministers held from 31 May to 1 June 2010, in Abuja (see www.ecosap.ecowas.int).

50. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region reported that, in partnership with the Regional Centre on Small Arms, small arms and light weapons electronic marking machines and training for officers on arms marking were provided to the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo and Zambia, with the aim to strengthen the stockpile management and tracing of small arms and light weapons. It was reported that, in collaboration with the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa, studies on disarmament of armed pastoralist communities in the Karamoja Cluster, which consists of the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda, were concluded in April 2010. Community awareness and outreach programmes along the Karamoja Cluster were also reported to be ongoing (see www.icglr.org).

51. The Regional Centre on Small Arms reported that it continues to coordinate efforts of its States members in addressing the effective control of arms transfers

[13] See www.unrec.org and www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/Yearbook/index.shtml.

within and outside the subregion, including in collaboration with the African Union, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and other civil society organizations in Africa. On a legislative and policy level, the Regional Centre on Small Arms reported that it is developing "best practice guidelines on practical disarmament" with support from the Government of Japan.

52. On a technical level, it was reported that 31 arms marking units have been distributed to 12 Regional Centre on Small Arms States members and that, to date, 72,612 firearms have been marked in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, with a view to improving the traceability, accountability and stockpile inventory management of firearms. Lastly, it was also reported that a public awareness campaign held between August and October 2009 in Burundi resulted in the voluntary surrender of 2,594 firearms, 12,820 grenades, 540 bombs and 38 landmines as at 30 March 2010 (see www.recsasec.org).

53. The Southern African Development Community reported that its States members continued to implement joint arms collection and destruction operations and that new, more stringent arms and ammunition legislation was passed. It was also reported that Malawi's initiative to establish "millennium development villages" was an endeavour to integrate armed violence reduction and development programming. It was also highlighted that civil society across the SADC region continues to play a role in the combating of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

54. The Southern African Development Community reported that, in 2010, through cooperation with the East African Community, Government officials from Kenya visited South Africa to share lessons learned and best practices in the areas of stockpile management and destruction. Progress was also reported on the harmonization of national firearms licence databases which would be a cornerstone for the successful implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (see www.sadc.int).

**Americas**

55. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to assist Member States (Bolivia, Colombia, Panama and Peru) in training their law enforcement officers, utilizing the Centre's improved inter-institutional training course for combating the illicit trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives. The Centre also organized a subregional training course for law enforcement officers from Central American States in San José in March 2010. The Centre provided assistance to eight Caribbean States to strengthen their capacity to improve stockpile management and to carry out the destruction of firearms.[14]

56. The Centre also provided legal and policy support to four Andean States, with the aim of strengthening the implementation of national firearms legislation and their harmonization with international instruments, as well as inter-agency coordination mechanisms. In carrying out these activities, it worked in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, reinforcing their capacity to provide assistance to States in the region.

[14] Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.

57. The Centre also organized or co-organized a total of four regional and subregional seminars or workshops on small arms-related issues throughout the region. These workshops were mainly aimed at further raising awareness about reducing and preventing armed violence and strengthening civil society's role in combating illicit firearms.[15]

58. The Centre is currently undertaking a comparative study on armed violence on school premises in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first study of its kind in this region by United Nations agencies and leading non-governmental organizations dealing with small arms and light weapons.

59. The Organization of American States (OAS) reported that its General Secretariat initiated the strengthening of the national capacity of 30 Governments of the region to mark imported or confiscated firearms, as well as the marking of firearms at the point of manufacture.[16] It is envisaged that at least one marking machine will be provided for each of the 30 States of the region. In the context of this initiative, OAS is also preparing a study to identify and analyse national firearms marking legislation in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as current marking processes and practices in the region.

60. The Organization reported that it launched a programme to strengthen the capacity of Central American countries to manage their stockpiles and destroy surplus firearms and ammunition. Through this project, Guatemala and Nicaragua received assistance for the destruction of obsolete ammunition, in order to prevent large-scale accidents in urban areas. The project has contributed to the destruction of over 150 tons of ammunition. Training in destruction techniques of arms and ammunition will also be held for experts from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.

61. The Organization reported collaborating on small arms-related issues with the Central American Integration System small arms control division, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and civil society and industry by exchanging information and experiences.

62. The States members of OAS adopted the Declaration of Lima: Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Americas at the fortieth regular session of the OAS General Assembly, held in June 2010. OAS States members reaffirmed their commitment to promote transparency in arms acquisitions, in accordance with pertinent United Nations and OAS resolutions (see www.oas.org).

63. The Central American Integration System reported that it focused on creating a national project for the collection of small arms and is promoting training and small arms control. Through its Central American Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Programme best practices project, it is seeking to improve its own capacity and that of States members in responding to the threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons.[17]

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[15] See www.unlirec.org and www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/Yearbook/index.shtml.

[16] Funded by the United States of America.

[17] www.sica.int/index_en.aspx.

**Asia and the Pacific**

64. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific organized a regional seminar for East and South-east Asian States in February 2010 in Bangkok, to discuss ways and means to enhance international and regional cooperation on combating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons. The Centre worked closely with civil society organizations in the region and supported their efforts to address the issue of illicit small arms. At a regional meeting on peace and security in South Asia and on priorities for regional cooperation on small arms and light weapons control, held in November 2009 at Dhaka, the Centre shared its experience and expertise in the implementation of the Programme of Action in South Asia and promoted cooperation among regional actors. The Centre also initiated a series of discussion forums in Kathmandu on promoting disarmament efforts in Nepal, focusing on illicit small arms and gun violence.[18]

**Europe**

65. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported that its participating States committed themselves to establishing or reinforcing a legal framework for brokering activities within their national jurisdictions by the end of 2010, with a review of the implementation of that decision to take place by September 2011. The Organization also reported that, on the basis of a list of the minimum elements that an end-use certificate should contain, OSCE participating States exchanged sample end-use certificates, on a restricted website, to facilitate the authentication process by national authorities.

66. In May 2010, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation adopted a decision on an OSCE plan of action on small arms and light weapons, the implementation of which will be subject to review by May 2012. Measures agreed upon under the action plan include more rigorous monitoring of the implementation of agreed norms and active assistance through targeted projects; possible expansion of the scope and strengthening of export and brokering controls; and facilitating the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument.

67. The Organization reported that other recent projects on small arms and light weapons include the destruction of over 300 man-portable air defence systems in Cyprus; the organization of a comprehensive programme in Tajikistan to strengthen national capacity on small arms and conventional ammunition; conventional ammunition control and anti drug-trafficking; and the initiation of the finalizing phase of a capacity-building project, organized jointly with the United Nations Development Programme, which is aimed at enhancing small arms and light weapons stockpile management and security in Belarus (see www.osce.org).

# III. Observations and conclusions

68. During the reporting period, there was heightened recognition, at the global level, of the importance of assessing the effectiveness of assistance provided to States in the area of small arms. Significantly, this issue was also noted in the

[18] See www.unrcpd.org.np and www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/Yearbook/index.shtml

outcome document of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States, which was adopted by consensus.

69. Acknowledgement that the issue of small arms and light weapons must be addressed through a wider, multisectoral lens is found in diverse, related processes, such as discussions on an arms trade treaty and initiatives on armed violence and development.

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Item 94 of the provisional agenda*
**Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security**

# Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

## Report of the Secretary-General

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# I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 64/25, the General Assembly invited all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:

(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;

(b) Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in this field;

(c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution;

(d) Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 26 February 2010, a note verbale was sent to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received are contained in section II below. Any additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

# II. Replies received from Governments

## Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[27 May 2010]

1. Cuba fully shares the concern expressed in General Assembly resolution 64/25 with respect to the use of information technologies and media for purposes incompatible with international stability and security and which adversely affect the integrity of States, to the detriment of their security in the civilian and military spheres. This resolution also appropriately stresses the need to prevent the use of information resources and technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes.

2. Cuba reiterates that the hostile use of telecommunications with the declared or hidden intent of undermining the legal and political order of States is a violation of the internationally recognized norms on this subject and a negative and irresponsible use of such means, which may give rise to tension and situations that are not conducive to international peace and security and thereby undermine the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Cuba draws attention with concern to the fact that information and telecommunication systems may be turned into weapons when they are designed and/or used to damage the infrastructure of a State and, as a result, may endanger international security and peace.

4. In this regard, Cuba reiterates its condemnation, already expressed in various international forums, of the aggressive escalation by successive United States administrations of their radio and television war against Cuba, in clear violation of the international rules in force governing the radio-electric spectrum.

5. The United States Government did not care about the damage which it might cause to international peace and security by creating dangerous situations, such as

the use of a military aircraft to transmit television signals to Cuba without its agreement.

6. The radio-electric aggression against Cuba from United States territory violates the principles of international law governing relations between States and the norms and regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which establish the conduct to be adopted by member countries of that specialized agency of the United Nations system.

7. Each week, broadcasters located in United States territory transmit thousands of hours of radio and television programmes on 34 different medium-wave, short-wave, FM and TV frequencies. In March 2010, there were 2,156 hours of illegal transmissions each week. Several of these broadcasters belong to or offer their services to organizations linked with known terrorist elements who live in and act against Cuba from United States territory, with the full agreement of the United States authorities.

8. The illegal radio and television broadcasts against Cuba do not provide information; on the contrary, they falsify and distort it for subversive purposes. For actions of this kind, the United States Congress annually approves a budget of over $30 million in federal funds. Since the two broadcasters commenced activities, the United States Government has spent $659.8 billion for this purpose.

9. These provocative broadcasts against Cuba constitute violations of the following international principles:

- The fundamental principles of the International Telecommunication Union, expressed in the preamble to its Constitution, on the growing importance of telecommunication for the preservation of peace and the economic and social development of all States, with the object of facilitating peaceful relations, international cooperation among peoples and economic and social development by means of efficient telecommunication services. The content of the television programming broadcast by the Government of the United States of America against Cuba is subversive, destabilizing and deceptive in character, contradicting those principles.

- Provisions CS 197 and CS 198 of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union stating that all stations must be effectively established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other member States.

- Agreement at the ninth plenary meeting of the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) held in November 2007, which stated in paragraph 6.1 (g) "that a broadcasting station operating on board an aircraft and transmitting solely to the territory of another administration without its agreement cannot be considered in conformity with the Radio Regulations".

- ITU Radio Regulation 8.3 establishing that internationally recognized frequency assignments recorded must be taken into account by other administrations when making their own assignments, in order to avoid harmful interference.

- ITU Radio Regulation 42.4, prohibiting the operation of a broadcasting service by an aircraft station at sea and over the sea.

- A ruling of the ITU Radio Regulations Board, which at its 35th meeting in December 2004 established that United States emissions on 213 MHz resulted in harmful interference with Cuban services and requested the United States Government to take the relevant measures to halt them. Furthermore, since September 2006 the Radio Regulations Board has been requesting the United States Government to take measures to eliminate interference on 509 MHz, with no response to date. In the Summary of Decisions of the fiftieth meeting of the Board, which ended on 20 March 2009 (document RRB09-1/5), it was once again stated that the transmissions are illegal and the United States Government was requested to take all necessary steps with a view to eliminating these two cases of interference with television services in Cuba. On 26 March 2010, at its fifty-third meeting, the ITU Radio Regulations Board reiterated its conclusion that the broadcasts from the United States cause interference harmful to the Cuban stations included in the International Frequency Register and urged the United States administration to eliminate this harmful interference, requesting the Radiocommunication Bureau to monitor the situation and to act in accordance with the procedures established in the Radio Regulations.

- ITU Radio Regulation 23.3, limiting television broadcasting outside national frontiers.

10. A report issued in January 2009 by the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the United States of America, an official government agency, recognizes the violations of international norms and domestic legislation committed by the programme of radio and television broadcasts by the United States Government against Cuba.

- The report recalled that the International Telecommunication Union had determined in 2004 and 2006 that United States broadcasting on channels 13 and 20 was causing harmful interference to Cuban stations and that the State Department had taken no action in response to the ITU determination. The report also stated that the World Radiocommunication Conference, held in November 2007, had found that transmission from an aircraft was not in conformity with ITU regulations.

- The report had stated that, although United States legislation prohibited the domestic dissemination of broadcasts of that type, both the radio and television broadcasts were received in the territory of the United States, principally in Miami, and that the stations under contract aired paid political advertisements and commercials for sex services. In addition, it noted that the broadcasts against Cuba did not adhere to journalistic standards of balance and objectivity and used incendiary and offensive language.

11. Cuba recalls, moreover, that the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-07), which met in Geneva, Switzerland, from 22 October to 16 November 2007, adopted conclusions that found transmissions from aircraft from the United States to Cuba to be in violation of the Radio Regulations. The conclusions endorsed by the plenary stated that "*a broadcasting station operating on board an aircraft and transmitting solely to the territory of another administration without its agreement cannot be considered in conformity with the Radio Regulations*".

12. These conclusions were agreed in the plenary of the 2007 Conference and have legal standing in the work of ITU. The World Radiocommunication Conference thus

endorsed the 1990 ruling of the former International Frequency Registration Board that television broadcasts from an aerostat with programming directed to Cuban national territory were in violation of the regulations.

13. The hostility of the Government of the United States of America towards Cuba has been manifested through the economic, financial and trade embargo imposed for almost 50 years, which also affects information and telecommunications.

- Cuba is not able to access the services provided by many websites; when it is recognized that the link is being established from an Internet address with the Cuban domain name .cu, access is denied.
- Without prior notification, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has blocked .com domains related to Cuba.
- Because of the laws on the economic, trade and financial embargo imposed by the Government of the United States of America, Cuba is unable to connect to the fibre-optic cables that surround the Cuban archipelago, forcing the country to pay for satellite services involving bandwidth restrictions, serious problems acquiring the necessary technologies and high connection costs.
- The Internet is being used to conduct defamatory campaigns against Cuba for subversive purposes and in order to discredit the country.

14. This attitude erodes the spirit, the intentions and the conclusions that prevailed among the nations of the entire world when they met in Switzerland and Tunisia during the World Summit on the Information Society, in 2003 and 2005.

15. The Summit strongly urged States, in building the information society, to take steps with a view to the avoidance of, and refrain from, any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impedes the full achievement of economic and social development by the population of the affected countries and that hinders the well-being of their population.

16. The discussion in the United Nations General Assembly about developments in information and telecommunications in the context of international security is very relevant and becoming ever more timely and important. Actions by the United States against Cuba such as those described above confirm the need for this debate and the urgency of finding ways to end such manifestations.

17. Cuba strongly supports this exercise by the General Assembly and will continue to spare no effort to contribute to the peaceful global development of information and telecommunication technologies and their use for the good of all humanity. It is also ready to collaborate with other countries, including the United States of America, to find solutions that will overcome the obstacles preventing the achievement of these goals.

## Greece

[Original: English]
[28 June 2010]

1. Information security issues have been more extensively addressed than in the past. Counter-measures to the modern threats that are inherent to the advent of the globalization of networks and systems are certainly considered. Measures to

preserve the free flow of information are studied and applied in the national and cross-border context.

2. Current international and multinational concepts are followed and studied. International guidance on risk assessment is needed. Cyber defence should also be addressed. National sovereignty rights for information security in global sharing should be maintained.

3. It is understood that all Member States should continue to inform the Secretary-General on their views and assessments on the corresponding questions. In this respect the following points are noted:

(a) All information security issues are highly appreciated in general;

(b) Ways to preserve the free flow of information and provide for the required degrees of confidentiality, integrity and availability are studied and applied within the national and cross-border context;

(c) The concepts for the interconnection of networks that provide for capabilities enabled and shared at both the national and international levels should be drafted and agreed. Risk assessment for the interconnection of networks must prevail and relevant international guidance should be available. Further to that, and since a very serious concern for every nation has been the need to take measures for its cyber defence, coherent international guidance is needed for cooperation, efficiency and economy. Last but not least, the requirement for a nation to preserve its sovereignty and maintain its own base of information cannot be overlooked and every concept drafted should account for that;

(d) Possible measure to be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level are the following:

(1) Relevant international concepts should be detailed and agreed;

(2) A guidance plan for a harmonized generic infrastructure, covering basic legislation matters, could be proposed, in order to deliver to a number of certified users the required information security for electronic handling of all correspondence and messaging, providing multiple ways of communication;

(3) Concepts followed by multinational alliances and small nations' constellations should be harmonized and expanded to be applicable at the global level. The agreement to specify the threat and its negative effect could be more than the engineering of any sophisticated measures devised, since they could also be used by adversaries;

(4) In parallel to all of the above, the nation's sovereignty should be understood as the basic reference for every attempt of globalization. An international concept for defining the national information exchange gateways, with scenarios reflecting the desired level of integration, should be drafted and used as a guide, for all efforts at the national, multinational and international levels.

## Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[18 May 2010]

**General overview of information security problems**

1. In Mexico, the banking and financial institutions, as well as the units of the Federal Government dealing with public security and national security, are the organizations making the greatest effort in the area of computer security. There is a Cybercrime Unit and a cyberpolice unit within the Federal Public Security Secretariat to deal with public security cybercrime.

2. On the other hand, although individual efforts to combat cybercrime are being made in the three branches of government, the Federal Government does not have a cybersecurity policy governing strategies to combat cybercrime in Mexico, the legislation on the subject must be strengthened, judges need more tools for dealing with and punishing cybercrime, and the regulations on Internet service providers also need to be expanded so that they are required to keep a record of activity on their platforms and to provide information in the event of an incident. There is also a need for domestic agreements and cooperation arrangements with other countries for combating cybercrime and cyberterrorism undermining national security.

**Measures adopted at the national level to enhance information security and contribute to international cooperation in this area**

3. Efforts are being made in Mexico to create certainty as regards information security:

(a) Certain cybercrimes are covered in the following laws: Federal Criminal Code, Federal District Criminal Code, Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, Coloma Data Protection Act, and Criminal Codes of the states of Aguascalientes, Sinaloa, Tabasco and Tamaulipas;

(b) On 30 April 2009, the Official Gazette of Mexico published the Decree adding section XXIX-O to article 73 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, authorizing Congress to legislate on the protection of personal data in the possession of individuals;

(c) On 1 June 2009, the Decree was published adding a second paragraph to article 16 of the Constitution, recognizing that all individuals are entitled to protection of their personal data and the right to access, correct and delete such data, as well as to express their objection, in the manner established by the law, which establishes grounds for waiving the principles governing data processing for reasons of national security, law and order, public safety and health or to protect the rights of third parties;

(d) The Computer Security Incident Response Team of the National Autonomous University of Mexico deals with security problems in academia and provides support and technical advice to the Mexican authorities in dealing with cybercrime;

(e) There is a cyberpolice unit in the federal police force to follow up investigations on public security crimes;

(f) An executive report on cybervulnerability is being prepared by the Federal Government to inform senior government authorities about global cyberincidents in order to organize and support initiatives promoting cybersecurity in Mexico;

(g) It is planned to create a national CSIRT[1] within the Federal Government to coordinate efforts to combat cybercrime at home and abroad;

(h) Cybervulnerability is an item on the National Risk Agenda;

(i) There are programmes, coordinated by public and private bodies, to raise the awareness of the general public for the prevention of cybercrime;

(j) Mexico participates in various forums and has goodwill agreements with other countries on the subject of cybercrime.

**Measures which the international community could take to strengthen global information security**

4. The following are measures to strengthen global information security:

(a) Adoption of suitable legislation or updating of existing legislation as necessary for the protection of information in cyberspace;

(b) Training of judges in cybersecurity issues so that they can understand the nature of cybercrime and deliver appropriate sentences;

(c) Establishment of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams to coordinate efforts to deal with major security incidents and serve as contact points with other countries;

(d) Ongoing communication between national Computer Security Incident Response Teams so that they can coordinate their response in the event of a regional or global incident;

(e) Organization of forums for sharing experience and training security teams that are members of the international community;

(f) International arrangements for collaboration to combat cybercrime in order to facilitate investigations and form a united front.

## Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[21 June 2010]

1. There are institutions in the Republic of Panama combating inappropriate use of the Internet for criminal purposes including terrorist acts, including the National Security Council and the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Science with its Department of Law and Order.

2. The National Security Council does intelligence work to combat organized crime, including terrorism, in connection with a possible attack on the property and integrity of the national territory.

[1] CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team.

3. The Institute of Forensic Medicine and Science has a Department of Law and Order, created by Act No. 69 of 27 December 2007, which investigates cybercrime.

4. Our Criminal Code criminalizes, suppresses and punishes use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Article 289 states "Any person using the Internet to provide training for the commission of terrorist acts or to recruit others to commit such acts shall be punished by imprisonment for five to ten years."

5. Other legal texts punish the use of the Internet for criminal purposes and provide criminal, civil and administrative penalties, governed by Act No. 14 of 18 May 2007, title VIII, chapter I (Computer security crimes), Act No. 51 of 22 July 2008 regulating electronic documents and electronic signatures and provision of services and include other provisions on the development of e-trade and Act No. 38 of 8 February 1996 enacting rules to govern telecommunications in the Republic of Panama.

## Qatar

[Original: English]
[25 May 2010]

1. The State of Qatar is convinced that information and communication technology should be used in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles of international relations. Moreover, free flow of information must be guaranteed without prejudice to national sovereignty and while maintaining security and respect for cultural, political and moral differences among nations.

2. Efforts at the national level are based on the interest in security communications and to enhance it from time to time in order to keep up with its advancement at the national and international levels.

3. National efforts can be summarized as follows:

- Setting security strategies and policies and promulgation of laws to restrict the use of this technology for purposes that are not in accordance with the goals of the protection of the stability of security
- Establishing a mechanism to reinforce the security of information in order to guarantee the protection of the infrastructure of the sensitive information of Qatar
- The Office of Internet Security and Intelligence seeks to monitor government networks and the national network in order to address threats to the State of Qatar through the Internet
- Management of Internet incidents and coordinating efforts to resolve them aims to guarantee the resolution of Internet-related issues after reporting them, with minimum downtime. In the State of Qatar this is done by the Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team (Q-CERT)
- A more effective role for information and awareness to improve the level of technical skills and qualifications of employees in Qatari institutions
- Providing support to Qataris in dealing with Internet-related issues

- Follow-up on the latest advancements in the field of modern technological science related to the security and safety of the Internet, and ensuring the assessment of technical products, its security and services
- Advancing international relations in order to deal with Internet-related issues. The State of Qatar has participated in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) and the Meridian Process.

4. The most important measures that the international community can take to promote the security of information at the national level are the following:

- The United Nations should continue to lead the discussion and provide more clarification regarding the use of information and wired and wireless communication technology in electronic warfare, and whether existing principles of international law are sufficient to provide an appropriate framework to determine appropriate behaviour online regarding aggressive acts
- The establishment of an international ad hoc committee for the security of wired and wireless information and providing comprehensive studies related to this issue
- The State of Qatar encourages all Member States to create teams to address computer emergencies at the national level
- Contracting with specialized security institutions in the communication field
- Raising security awareness through symposiums and meetings at the local and international levels
- Encouraging States to cooperate in order to combat espionage and electronic piracy
- Usage of encrypted and secured equipment to transfer information and documents in a secured manner to ensure its confidentiality when it is exchanged
- Updating protection systems and convening regular workshops to take stock of the latest in science in the area of the advancement of information security.

## Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[12 May 2010]

### Achievements in the use of information technology and telecommunications in the context of international security

1. The growing role of information technology in the various spheres of activity in society has led to concern for information security. As advanced information technology enters the everyday life of States and societies, the opportunities for cyberattacks against information and telecommunications systems, against the information resources of State bodies and against commercial entities on the part of criminal elements and individuals, seeking to commit criminal acts, have grown.

2. Half of all recorded computer crimes involve unauthorized access to computer information. Computer crime for profit is growing, as is the material damage it causes. The number of crimes committed by transnational hacker groups is also growing.

3. Computer crimes are rarely reported and efforts to determine the full extent of such crimes are usually frustrated, as the government and business entities that fall victim to such attacks always try to hide that fact, so as not to risk losing their authority, and they are reluctant to reveal the losses suffered and the weakness of their information protection systems. As a result, cases of such crimes are often not reported, which speaks to the need to develop concerted prophylactic and preventive measures, which should be at the core of information protection systems.

4. A computer crime is usually only the first step in a series of criminal acts, like the traditional types of crime, namely, theft, extortion, fraud and so forth. These crimes are constantly becoming more sophisticated and hidden and their execution improving, causing huge economic and political harm in practically all countries of the world. Furthermore, most experts see a direct link between the information sovereignty of States and matters of national security.

5. Efforts to combat crime in the field of information technology encounter many problems of a legal nature resulting from the non-material and frequently ephemeral nature of computer evidence. The complex issues involved in dealing with the problems encountered in cybercrime make international cooperation even more necessary. For that reason all countries must in the end establish appropriate and mutually compatible legal, procedural and normative tools.

6. In practice the investigation of computer crime has shown the imperative need for cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of States.

7. In international practice joint measures are usually taken to investigate computer crime. The Ukrainian Security Service participates actively in joint operations by law enforcement agencies and special services as part of efforts to combat child pornography, fraud perpetrated via the Internet and international terrorism.

8. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen efforts aimed at further developing cooperation in the provision of information security, protecting shared interests and introducing steps for their protection, mainly in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. A successful solution to the problems of information security can be found only if there is effective cooperation between the government bodies of the various States, especially since the required legal basis is already in place.

9. Given the need to combat the threats of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, the Ukrainian Security Service maintains contacts with the law enforcement agencies and special services of foreign States.

10. It should be pointed out that cybercriminals often select as their targets networks established by government offices. Furthermore, the success of efforts to track down and punish criminals depends on the quality of the international links that are established and on the optimization of national legislation to meet current standards.

11. Bearing in mind the continuous global growth in computer crime, the existence of links between criminal hacker groups in various countries and the fact that

cyberthreats bear no relation to national borders, it is vital that international cooperation in the fight against cyberthreats be expanded.

12. With a view to implementing the decisions of the World Summit on the Information Society (first phase held in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003; second phase held in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005), Ukraine adopted an Act on basic principles for the development of the information society in Ukraine for 2007-2015. Its fundamental priorities are integration into the global information environment and development of the information society. The Act is intended to enable the latest information and communication technologies to be used in an atmosphere of better security.

13. In addition, a plan for the development of telecommunications in Ukraine has been drawn up and adopted. It provides for logistical and technical efforts to ensure the secure operation of all components of Ukraine's telecommunications infrastructure, including:

- establishing and introducing gradually a normative and legal basis to protect information, through technical means and encryption, ensuring harmonization with European and global standards;
- developing up-to-date information protection methods using technology to address comprehensively the task of protecting information in telecommunication networks;
- establishing systems to legally intercept information in telecommunication networks in the instances provided for by the law;
- establishing a State coordination centre for security in public information and telecommunication networks and helping to establish State and non-governmental centres to react and respond to incidents on those networks.

14. The normative and legal basis for information protection in Ukraine also includes Acts on the fundamental principles of national security; on information; on information protection and information and telecommunication systems; issuances of the President and Cabinet of Ministers on the technical protection of information in Ukraine; rules for the protection of information and telecommunication systems and networks and procedures for connection to global data-transmission networks. It also includes a large number of normative acts registered with the Ministry of Justice and having as their purpose to regulate connection of information systems to global data-transmission networks, licensing of particular types of activity and procedures for assessing information protection.

15. Normative and legal acts provide that the requisite protection of information should be achieved using only protected information and communication technology systems, in other words, those incorporating a comprehensive information protection system as a single body of legal and logistical measures, software and hardware, intended to counter threats. The comprehensive system, and its information-protection components, must be certified as compliant with information-protection standards.

16. In order to regulate the requirements for comprehensive information protection systems and their components, Ukraine has developed and introduced some 50 technical standards laying down criteria for the assessment of information protection, the classification of information and communication technology,

procedures for achieving information protection requirements for the individual components of a comprehensive information protection system depending on the variety of information and communication technology involved, the ultimate purpose, the field of use and the type of information processed.

17. Ukraine has also created its own national system of criteria for assessing the security of information technologies. The system is based on a set of regulatory instruments on protecting information in information and telecommunications systems from unauthorized access; these instruments have been harmonized with similar instruments of European Union countries and with international standards, in particular standard 15408 of the International Organization for Standardization/ International Electrotechnical Commission.

18. In addition, a national system of organizational and technical measures is being established in Ukraine with a view to preventing unauthorized acts against the information and telecommunications systems of the State authorities, law enforcement, customs and tax authorities, credit and financial institutions and others, in particular attempts to interfere with their work through the Internet.

19. As specified in article 16, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Act on the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection, and in order to improve coordination between State agencies for the detection of threats to information in information and telecommunications systems, to deal with the consequences of implementation of such threats and to organize international cooperation in such matters, the appropriate Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) has been created within the Service and is operational.

20. Reflecting the global trend towards networks of rapid reaction facilities, CERT responds to computer emergencies. International coordination of the activities of such facilities is provided by the international Forum for Incident Response Security Teams (FIRST), a forum for teams responding to security incidents.

21. On 13 July 2009, CERT-UA (www.cert.gov.ua) became a full member of FIRST.

22. Among its activities for 2009, CERT-UA processed 461 reports from CERTs in 30 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United States of America) of unauthorized acts in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet (distribution of harmful software, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and other attempts to commit unauthorized acts).

23. It should be added that Ukraine has created a legal and regulatory framework and made efforts to ensure cooperation between the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection and the law enforcement agencies with a view to implementing measures to safeguard the security of State information resources in information and telecommunications systems and improving the effectiveness of the system for responding to unauthorized acts against those information resources.

24. Thus, in Ukraine, information can now be protected at all stages of the establishment of information and telecommunications systems and the

comprehensive information protection systems within them, irrespective of the type and criticality of the information being processed and the type and complexity of the information and telecommunications system. Moreover, all the basic approaches to the elaboration of requirements, design, development, security assessment and protection of information resources in information and telecommunications systems as a whole correspond to the approaches employed by the State security services of the Member States of the United Nations and the member States of the European Union.

25. With a view to training specialists in the field of information security and computer engineering, an Institute for Information Protection has been set up as an academic and scientific department of the State University of Information and Communications Technologies.

## United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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[2 June 2010]

1. The United Kingdom is pleased to respond to General Assembly resolution 64/25, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

2. We consider this to be a most important topic, vital to individual nations, their commerce, the protection of their citizens and in the broader context of international security. The United Kingdom devotes considerable effort so as to make cyberspace a safer place for all nations and we welcome international activities in this sphere, as we believe that all nations should cooperate in promoting a safe and resilient environment in cyberspace.

### General appreciation of the issues of information security

3. We believe that a secure cyberspace is vital to today's world. Citizens, commerce, critical national infrastructure and government are increasingly dependent on the Internet. Any event that adversely affects the Internet service within a nation is likely to have consequences for that nation, perhaps of a severe nature. It is an unfortunate fact that there is likely to be a number of threat actors, both external and internal to any nation, who may attempt to disrupt or manipulate the Internet service for any of a number of reasons.

### Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in the field

4. The United Kingdom continues to work domestically and internationally so as to promote safer cyberspace. Domestically, we published our National Cyber Security Strategy in June 2009. This document underpins the national effort on information security. The Strategy calls for two new organizations, the Office of Cyber Security and the Cyber Security Operations Centre. The organizations have been established and continue to grow. There are three computer emergency response teams (CERTs) run by the United Kingdom government and which provide a specialist service to United Kingdom critical national infrastructure, military and other government networks. Internationally, we are also active in this work. Our

United Nations involvement includes membership of the Group of Governmental Experts. We co-sponsored the United Nations resolution on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures. We have membership of relevant International Telecommunication Union (ITU) bodies. We participate in activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. With our full support and participation, the European Union (EU) has begun work on several initiatives on the protection of critical national infrastructure in the EU. We participated in the EU engagement with the ASEAN Regional Forum work on cybersecurity. Similarly we participate in a number of activities within NATO as part of protecting that organization's networks. The United Kingdom has long been a leading nation within MERIDIAN (www.meridian2007.org), FIRST (Forum on Incident Response and Security Teams, www.first.org) and the EGC (European Government Certs Group, www.egc-group.org).

5. The United Kingdom National Cyber Security Strategy is available for download from the Cabinet Office web page at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk.

**Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level**

6. We encourage all nations to establish national computer emergency response teams. We encourage all nations to enact effective domestic legislation on cybercrime. We believe that whereas e-crime is not the only malicious activity in cyberspace, it is the most prevalent, and that a reduction of criminal activity will benefit all. We believe that the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime represents a suitable instrument for combating international e-crime. Additionally, we believe that the toolkit developed by the ITU and promoted in the United Nations provides a good basis for nations to perform a self-assessment of their readiness to cope with potential attacks on critical national infrastructure. We welcome efforts within many forums to promote information security best practice.

**Relevant international concepts**

7. The primary international concept is that of international law. There is considerable debate, particularly at cyber conferences, about the applicability of existing international law to cyberspace. The United Kingdom has examined this issue, and our view is that the existing principles of international law, on both the use of force and the law of armed conflict, provide an appropriate framework within which to identify and analyse the use of cyberspace in the context of hostilities.